The Fifth District recently published a new simplified EOT format which is now preferred by this court.
IMPORTANT TIP#1 COURT'S FORM: The court's extension of time form (PDF link will open in new window) behaves best using Adobe Reader XI (the most current version of the free download reader). In testing, we were unable to save a copy of the document using either version 9 or 10. Save a copy to your desktop before you start using the form. Once you have filled in the information, either print or save a copy, but check your saved document to be sure it's not a blank copy. If you are unable to save a completed copy of it, printed copies can then be scanned and sent to the court for e-filing purposes as this court does not require searchable PDFs for e-filing. [Please note that other districts are different. Often a scanned document does not produce a searchable PDF and therefore will not work for e-filing in another court.].
IMPORTANT TIP#2 CCAP'S FORM: If you experience problems either opening or saving the court's form, the CCAP samples book now contains alternative versions of the simplified form under "E" for EOT. [Note: Counsel must still convert Word and WordPerfect versions to a PDF in order to e-file a first time EOT with this court. The court has posted how-to instructions (PDF link will open in new window) on converting documents to a PDF.
Beginning October 22, 2012, the Fifth District Court of Appeal clerk’s office began transmitting by email attachment, rather than paper copies, to appointed counsel, the AG, and to CCAP, routine letters and notices identified in the attached chart (PDF will open in new window). The email subject line will contain the court’s case number, caption and a 3-letter code for the type of document as identified in the chart. The name of the attachment will mimic the email subject line. The body of the email will include the Deputy Clerk’s name and DCA name/address so that the recipient will have contact information.
The court’s new email notification project does not apply to delinquency appeals, dependency appeals or other confidential case matters. These cases will continue to be notified by mail in paper format.
For other helpful tips and PDF information sheets about the Fifth District’s “greening,” please refer to our e-filing procedures page.
Time spent on a subject, whether completed or not, should now be claimed on the closest related line item on the claim form for that subject or task, not on a line for "other" services.
For example, line #11 (Habeas) now includes all of the following habeas-related tasks:
· Preliminary time spent investigating potential habeas issues in the context of preparing an application to expand the scope of the appointment, identified by each potential issue investigated;
· All miscellaneous communications specifically related to habeas-issue investigation (rather than line 23);
· The motion to expand appointment; and,
· All project habeas-related consultation time (rather than line 21).
(The exception is for line 1 habeas-related communication time.)
The Fifth District's policy for mandatory e-Filing (link will open in new window) of all Wende briefs for an adult criminal appeal is now in effect.
Do not use e-Filing or e-Submission procedures in any juvenile delinquency, dependency, LPS, or any other confidential appellate cases.
Read our FAQ page for details on e-Filing in the Fifth.
CCAP now has the ability to send you a tracking number for any package we send to you via UPS, such as transcripts. The email will have our name in the body of the message along with shipping details, the related case number, and a specific tracking number. Although the email "sender" will be UPS Quantum View [email@example.com], your email address is only used for "pass through" in the UPS system and is not retained by them once the email is sent.
Please note: Our UPS notification email will never have attachments, and will never request any further information or action be taken on your part.
Simply enter the tracking number at www.ups.com (link will open in new window) to track your package.
This is a reminder that anything filed with the Court of Appeal needs a Proof of Service, not just a cc: list.
If you submit anything for filing -- whether it is a motion, a brief, or even a court response form (such as the oral argument response form) -- you should always include a formal Proof of Service with that filing.
A cc: list is not sufficient to meet this requirement.
Notes From CCAP
re: Timing of Augment Requests
In October 2010, the court notified CCAP that counsel appeared to be more frequently filing an MTA after first obtaining an EOT. Here is a reminder of the court's long-standing policy on this matter as reiterated in an April 2011 meeting with Presiding Justice Vance Raye:
If the record in incomplete, the Third expects an MTA be filed before an EOT is filed. You must meet the augment deadline specified in the appointment order. If you cannot do so, an explanation for the variance from the court's policy should be included when the augment motion or an initial EOT is filed.
The point is not to deprive clients of necessary records, but to encourage timeliness in securing those records. Thus late requests will be considered on the merits. If the request is late, counsel should show good cause why it could not have been filed earlier or, if there is no good cause, should apologize and endeavor to avoid repetition.
Effective immediately, the Fifth District Court of Appeal will resume identifying the parties in juvenile dependency and delinquency cases by using their first name and initial in both published and unpublished opinions, unless circumstances (e.g. a unique first name) would indicate that this would compromise the aim of confidentiality. For publicly-available docket information in these cases, however, the court will continue to identify the parties by using initials only.
While this court never required panel attorneys to adopt the double suppression method in their briefs and motions, attorneys who voluntarily did so may resume using the parties' first name and initial in their briefs and motions.
Current procedures for both the Third and the Fifth District can be found online in the CCAP Procedural Comparsion Chart.
The Appointed Appellate Counsel projects have negotiated a deep discount on three different Lexis plans for all current statewide panel members. For information, questions and to sign up, please contact the appropriate regional territory manager -- choose the region closest to your office, not which panel project you are on:
Richard Markowitz: 415-699-4257
Cory Copeland: 909-593-8707
The regional territory manager will have your local sales representative contact you. Because some of the local reps may not be aware of the new discount for panel members, the regional rep will do that footwork for you.
Please note: The discount is not available to anyone who is in an existing contract with Lexis.com. Once the current contract expires, you will be free to take advantage of the group rate for the new contract period.
Appreciation goes to panel attorney Maureen Bodo for putting CCAP in touch with regional manager Rick Markowitz, and to Rick for presenting our panel’s special needs to the corporate office in Dayton, Ohio. Thank you both!
From the Third District
re: Late Requests
The Third District has asked CCAP to get the word out to the panel regarding late motions to augment. It has long been the policy in the Third District (as well as in the Fifth District) that motions to augment must be filed within the first 30 days and by the date specified in the appointment order. The court may be suspicious when it routinely receives an augment request the day the AOB is due, or after an EOT has already been filed, if there is no explanation accompanying it.
CCAP has warned attorneys who routinely practice this way that if the court's suspicions are not dispelled, the attorney runs the risk that the court will require more and better explanation for the need of the sought material before it will consider whether to grant the motion at all. Over time, your credibility suffers. That is, if the court believes the motion is just an attempt to get an extension by another name, and is not satisfied that the sought material is really necessary, it may deny the motion. While we have not yet seen this, it is within the court's discretion.
Panel attorneys are strongly advised to check their appointment orders and adhere to the specified augment dates routinely - whereas exceptions with a solid explanation for why a deadline was not met will not raise a red flag.
Yesterday Assembly Bill 1844, "Chelsea's Law," was signed into law. It is urgency legislation and takes effect immediately.
Although Chelsea's law deals mostly with sex offenses and their increasing punishment, section 15 amends Penal Code section 666, petit theft with a prior. The amended section provides that, in some circumstances, three or more prior convictions are needed to boost a misdemeanor petty theft to a felony. Counsel should review the amended statute and active cases involving this offense for potential Estrada ameliorations of punishment.
Penal Code Section 4019
In other news, on September 3, 2010, the Third District decided People v. Jones (2010) __ Cal.App.4th __ (C059440). The court concluded that prior convictions that disable a person from the more beneficial aspects of 4019 must be pleaded and proved. Moreover, the judge can strike priors for purposes of eligibility for 4019's more favorable scheme. The panel attorney appointed on the case was Ben Owens, and his briefing is available on the CCAP website. Congratulations to Ben for his victory in this case!
For issue spotting purposes, counsel should also be aware that in a separate case the Third District has requested briefing on the application section 4019 in a different context:
On August 26, 2010, in the case of In re Randy Kemp (C064821), the Third District requested supplemental briefing in response to a traverse filed by petitioner arguing that irrespective of the date of finality, the equal protection clauses of the California and federal constitutions compel the conclusion that the revised statute retroactively applies to all defendants who are presently serving a sentence, presently on parole, or presently on probation. The court has directed respondent to filing supplemental briefing by September 15. The traverse filed by panel attorney Beth Campbell can also be found on the CCAP website.
The Third District has now adopted the designation of parties in any juvenile case caption using initials only in place of first and last names. Thus, for all dependency and delinquency cases, the parties (and even non-parties) are identified by initials only, including the parent of a dependency minor.
All counsel are expected to follow and use the court-designated caption, including the use of initials where appropriate for minors and parents.
If appointed counsel have a question about whether the caption on older case paperwork is correct or not, it can be checked against the Court's docket online "Parties & Attorneys" entry (link will open in new window).
The Fifth District has not changed its policy; it uses full first name + last-name initial for any minor.
These procedures have been captured in our Procedural Comparison Chart.
From the Third District Clerk's Office
re: Sealed Record Requests
When filing a motion to augment for a sealed record, do not at the same time move for permission to view the sealed material. Instead, once the augmented record has been filed, THEN move for permission to view the sealed record. On receipt of the motion to view, the Court will examine the sealed record and determine whether to grant counsel's request to view it.
From a Recent Fifth District Order
re: Dependency Case Documents - While You're There . . .
"When[ever] counsel has the opportunity to review a juvenile dependency superior court file and discovers missing material which counsel believes should be part of the appellate record, counsel is urged to proceed as follows. If at all possible, counsel should obtain a certified copy of such material and submit it to this court, along with a motion to deem the material part of the appellate record. [See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.155(a)(1)(A) and (a)(2).] In this manner, delay in a priority appeal . . . may be avoided in the future."
On March 31st, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky (PDF) (08-651).
The issue presented in Padilla was whether the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel requires a criminal defense attorney to advise a non-citizen client that pleading guilty to an aggravated felony will trigger mandatory, automatic deportation, and if misadvice about deportation induces a guilty plea, can that misadvice amount to ineffective assistance of counsel and warrant setting aside the guilty plea.
The High Court recognized that deportation has become an integral part of the penalty for a criminal conviction for noncitizens. And so, the Court held the Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires that defense counsel inform a noncitizen defendant whether his plea carries a risk of deportation. When deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain, counsel need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that the plea carries a risk of adverse immigration consequences. But when a deportation consequence is clear, counsel has a duty to give correct advice.
Like the Kentucky Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court has deemed immigration consequences of a plea to be collateral consequences. (See In re Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal.4th 230, 242; People v. Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 198.) The California Supreme stated in dicta In re Resendiz that it was "not persuaded that the Sixth Amendment imposes a blanket obligation on defense counsel, when advising pleading defendants, to investigate immigration consequences or research immigration law." (Resendiz, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 249-250.) In that case the question was not squarely presented because the petitioner did not allege a mere failure to investigate, but rather argued his was misadvised of the consequences. (Ibid.) But Padilla now makes clear that defense counsel has an affirmative duty under the Sixth Amendment to provide advice on immigration consequences of a plea.
CCAP urges appellate counsel appointed to represent non-citizen defendants in guilty plea cases to review the plea advisements and inquire from the client and/or defense counsel whether any advice was given regarding immigration consequences. Appellate counsel may also wish to review their concluded cases to determine whether further action is warranted in light of Padilla.
Two defender organizations providing free resources on post-conviction relief for non-citizens are the Law Offices of Norton Tooby and the Immigrant Legal Resource Center. In addition, CCAP has posted an article by Mr. Tooby on the implications of Padilla. Finally, the attached document contains a more detailed analysis of the opinion.
In view of its Misc. Order #2010-2, here is the Third District's policy if the brief would otherwise be a Wende but for the PC 4019 issue:
(1) If counsel represents a client who is not eligible for PC 4019 additional credit even if the statute is applied retroactively to pending cases, and there is no other arguable issue, the court would expect counsel to file a standard Wende AOB; and (2) if counsel represents a client who is not statutorily excluded from prisoners entitled to additional credit under the terms of PC 4019 if applied retroactively to pending cases, and there is no other arguable issue, the court will accept a Wende brief that contains, in its statement of facts, an advisement that defendant may be entitled to additional credit under PC 4019 with citation to the Third District's Misc. Order #2010-002.
On March 19, 2010, the Third District requested supplemental briefing on the question of whether the defendant is entitled to a recalculation of credits under revised section 4019 given that he has a prior serious felony conviction. It also asked the parties to address whether the fact that the trial court struck the prior felony conviction pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 affects the calculation of presentence work and custody credits.
The case in which the court requested briefing is People v. Jones, C059440.
On March 16, the Third District issued Order #2010-002:
"In all pending appeals in which an opinion has not yet been filed and in which appellant is arguably entitled to additional presentence custody credits pursuant to the amendments to Penal Code section 4019, effective January 25, 2010, the court will deem the following issue raised without additional briefing:
"The amendments to Penal Code section 4019 apply retroactively to appeals pending on January 25, 2010; thus, appellant is entitled to recalculation of presentence work and custody credits."
[See People v. Brown (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1354, review granted 6/9/10 (S181963).]
On March 16, the Third District Court of Appeal held that the January 25, 2010 amendment to Penal Code section 4019, which increased presentence conduct credits to day-for-day for many defendants with non-serious felony convictions, must be applied retroactively to eligible defendants whose convictions were not final as of January 25. This includes all eligible defendants whose cases were on direct appeal or who had a petition for review pending in the Supreme Court on January 25.
The Third District’s opinion in People v. Brown (C056510) is based on In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740. The section 4019 retroactivity discussion is at pages 24-35 of the slip opinion.
There is now a conflict in published opinions on the subject, in light of the Fifth District’s March 1 opinion in People v. Rodriguez (F057533, published at 182 Cal.App.4th 535), which held that the amended section 4019 is not retroactive. In light of the conflict of authority, the issue seems destined to end up in the Supreme Court.
Further information will be posted on this website as it becomes available.
The Fifth District recently issued People v. Rodriguez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1, holding that the amended version of Penal Code section 4019 does not apply retroactively, and that application of the amendment in a prospective manner does not violate equal protection principles. [NOTE: review in Rodriquez was granted on 6/9/10 (S181808) was briefing deferred pending the Brown decision (S181963).]
Although the opinion is not yet final, it is immediately citable as authority. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(d).) And since the opinion now constitutes precedent, trial courts are bound by it under the doctrine of stare decisis. As such, seeking application of the amended statute in the trial court is futile.
Nevertheless, Rodriguez is not the last word on this issue. Appellate counsel should continue to argue in the Court of Appeal for application of revised Penal Code section 4019 for eligible clients whose convictions are not final on appeal as of January 25, 2010.
As to appeals pending in the Fifth District in particular, CCAP has contacted the court to determine what effect the Rodriguez decision has on that court’s standing order regarding the need for supplemental briefing on the issue of the retroactivity of Penal Code section 4019's new provisions. The court has advised us as follows:
The standing order still stands. The issue is deemed raised in every case. If all an attorney wants to accomplish in a supplemental brief is argue that Rodriguez was wrongly decided, the likelihood of getting the court's permission to file a supplemental brief is very low. If an attorney has something new and persuasive, e.g., a different slant on it or something that clearly shows the legislative intent, the chances of getting permission to file a supplemental brief is likely much higher. In other words, counsel's application for permission to file a supplemental brief must be compelling, and counsel should not assume that the request will be granted pro forma.
For cases where the opening brief is not yet filed, counsel can certainly raise and argue the issue fully in an opening brief. And it is proper to fully argue the issue in a reply brief, since the issue was deemed raised by the standing order. The standing order really has an impact only on the chances of getting permission to file a supplemental brief after normal briefing has otherwise been completed.
Panel attorney Mark Shusted has prepared sample briefing (PDF file) addressing Rodriguez which is available on the home page of the CCAP website.
Order Regarding Penal Code section 4019 Amendment Supplemental Briefing
In pending appeals in which an appellant arguably is entitled to additional presentence custody credits under the January 25, 2010 amendments to Penal Code section 4019, the court will deem the following issues raised without additional briefing:
(1) Under amended Penal Code section 4019, appellant is entitled to recalculation of presentence work and custody credits;
(2) To hold otherwise would violate equal protection principles.
This order applies to all appeals. If the court deems supplemental briefing necessary from either the appellant or the respondent, it will request a letter brief from counsel.
James A. Ardaiz, P.J.
Augmenting Pitchess Materials
A reminder that when asking the court to independently review the denial of a Pitchess motion, the record must be augmented with the necessary documents for such review. This includes the in-camera transcript, materials reviewed, ruling, etc. If these items are not made part of the record, this results in a delay in processing the appeal once it reaches chambers and a court attorney notices the missing record.
In light of the new In re Phoenix H. case (12/21/09, S155556) 47 Cal.4th 835, the Third District is adjusting their procedures for Sade C. filings, effective as of Jan. 7, 2010:
Pursuant to the dictates of Phoenix H., if no arguable issue can be discerned, counsel should no longer file a letter to that effect or move to substitute appellant to proceed in pro per. Rather, counsel should file a “Wende-type” brief [a “Phoenix H. brief”] which shall include an abbreviated recitation of the relevant facts and procedure and a declaration establishing that counsel has advised appellant that counsel has reviewed the entire record, served a copy of the brief on appellant, and informed appellant of appellant’s right to file, within 30 days of the filing of the “Phoenix H. brief,” a motion to file a supplemental brief supported by a showing of good cause that an arguable issue does exist.
In any case where appellant already has been permitted to proceed in pro per, the court will proceed to dispose of the appeal on the merits if an opening brief is filed by appellant.
Henceforth, all Sade C. letters and motions to substitute appellant in pro per will be rejected with a directive to file an opening brief in compliance with Phoenix H.
For your convenience, CCAP has drafted a sample Phoenix H. brief that meets the Third District’s new procedures, including all advisory elements.
FIFTH DISTRICT (revised as of 1/22/10)
The Fifth District has adopted new formal procedures in light of In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835. Please review these procedures carefully as they are slightly different than that of earlier announcements. The Court is aware that the California Supreme Court extended time for rehearing in Phoenix H. and the opinion is therefore not yet final. The Court will follow this policy in the meantime.
The Third District has noticed an increase in the number of times attorneys have failed to attach proof of service when documents are submitted to the clerk's office for filing. Please remember that rule 8.25(a) of the California Rules of Court requires a written proof of service whenever a document is to be served and filed. A "cc" notation is not a proof of service. (Note: This applies to any documents that are to be in the Court of Appeal; it does not apply to documents that are sent to the Court of Appeal that are marked "received" such as rule 8.340(b) letters where the original is filed in the superior court.)
On rare occasion, counsel is appointed on something that is not, in fact, appealable. The following is the policy for criminal and juvenile delinquency appeals pending in the Third District Court of Appeal when appointed counsel has concluded that the matter appealed from is not an appealable order or judgment.
The Third District will not consider a motion that asks the Court of Appeal to determine whether the case is appealable. Instead, when counsel has concluded that the matter appealed from is not appealable, doublecheck with the CCAP buddy, then submit a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. For the Statement of Appealability, counsel should state simply, "There may be a question as to the appealability of the matter being appealed."
The Third District will determine whether the case is properly before the Court when it conducts its review of the briefing in the ordinary course of the appeal. If the Court determines that it is, the Court will conduct a normal Wende review and request supplemental briefing on any issues that the Court believes should be briefed.
A Wende brief requires that the statement of the case and statement of the facts be adequate to assist the reviewing court during its Wende review. It is not proper to present an argument in the Statement of the Case, but it is proper to identify the proceedings that occurred in the court below that may give rise to an issue. CCAP recommends that counsel craft the Statement of the Case in a way that draws the Court's attention to potential issues in the event that the Court finds that the appeal is properly before the Court.
(There is no change in the policy followed in the Fifth District. In other words, if counsel determines that the matter is not appealable, ask the Fifth District Court of Appeal for instruction on whether to proceed with the briefing.)
Our Procedural Comparison Chart has been updated with this Third District policy change; see "Nonappealable case."
Effective immediately, the Fifth District Court of Appeal no longer requires counsel's declaration that "the absence of arguable issues is not a substantial factor in the dismissal of the appeal." Our Procedural Comparison Chart has been updated with this policy change.
In conjunction with EOT requests:
When an extension request is sent very close to the filing deadline, the attorney should call the clerk to advise that the extension request is on its way. That will minimize the risk that a late letter will be issued.
See our Extensions of Time article for a more complete discussion of EOT policies in both courts.
In conjunction with filing the AOB in compliance with rule 8.25 [formerly 40.1(b)(3)]:
If counsel relies on rule 8.25 by sending the brief on or before the due date by OVERNIGHT mail, it is NOT necessary to call the clerk. But if the brief is sent by EXPRESS mail or PRIORITY mail (neither of which guarantees next day delivery), the attorney should call the clerk to advise that the brief has been mailed in compliance with the rule.
Suppose a defendant whom you are representing has been convicted of cohabitant abuse (Pen. Code, § 273.5), aggravated assault (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and aggravated battery (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)), all based on the single act of stomping on his wife’s leg and breaking it. Do any of these offenses merge with any of the others, because it is necessarily included within another? Now suppose that the cohabitant-abuse and aggravated-assault convictions were enhanced by a finding (under Penal Code section 12022.7) that the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury (GBI) during their commission. Would the addition of this enhancement change the merger analysis?
It has long been established that a defendant may not be convicted of multiple crimes whose elements are wholly included within a greater offense for which he has been convicted on the basis of the same conduct. (People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 355 [“multiple convictions may not be based on necessarily included offenses”]; People v. Moran (1970) 1 Cal.3d 755, 763 [“If the evidence supports the verdict as to a greater offense, the conviction of that offense is controlling, and the conviction of the lesser offense must be reversed”].)
In People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, the California Supreme Court recently held that, “[i]n deciding whether multiple conviction is proper, a court should consider only the statutory elements.” (Id. at p. 1229.) Although Reed limits the scope of offenses that can be found to be lesser included offenses (LIOs) for purposes of the “Pearson” rule (i.e., by eliminating the “accusatory pleading” test for LIOs in the multiple-conviction context), two other cases presently pending in the California Supreme Court could expand the number of offenses that are LIOs and subject to reversal under the Pearson rule.
In People v. Sloan (S132605/C042448; 126 Cal.App.4th 1148, review granted 6/8/05) and in People v. Izaguirre (S132980/B169352; unpublished opinion, review granted 6/8/05), the Court will decide whether enhancements (e.g., weapon use, GBI infliction, etc.) are included in determining whether the “Pearson” ban on multiple convictions for necessarily included offenses applies.
Although prior cases have held that enhancements are not included in determining whether one offense necessarily includes another (In re Jose H. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1090, 1093-1096; and see People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal.3d 92, 96-101 [holding that enhancements should not be included in determining whether a trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on lesser included offenses]), the question is still unsettled, especially in light of the impact that intervening United States Supreme Court authority (viz., Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466; Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296) is having on the fleeting distinction between “enhancements” and “elements” when considering facts legally essential to the defendant’s sentence. (See, e.g., People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 326; People v. Seel (2004) 34 Cal.4th 535, 539, fn. 2.)
In light of the impact that additional convictions (even ones that have been stayed under Penal Code section 654 (see People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24)) can have on a defendant’s sentence in future cases (e.g., as strikes and serious-felony priors), panel attorneys are encouraged to challenge as many convictions as they can on “Pearson” grounds, and to make sure that enhancements are included in the LIO analysis, if their inclusion reduces the number of permissible convictions. (Because “one cannot be punished for the enhancement separately from the underlying offense” (People v. Smith (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 908, 914), it is possible that including enhancements in the LIO analysis will be contrary to the defendant’s interests in some situations (i.e., where an unenhanced conviction is a LIO of another offense of conviction, but would not be if its enhancement(s) were included in the analysis).)
Your CCAP staff buddy can help you analyze how and if to raise a Sloan/Izaguirre issue, if the facts of a case arguably present such an issue. Finally, a discussion of this issue is contained in section VI of the “JABS” and “Upper Cuts” article (PDF link will open in new window) on the Apprendi/Blakely page of CCAP’s website, and the Respondent’s Brief on the Merits filed in People v. Sloan, S132605, is available via our website’s Searchlight feature.
Our eNews sending domain name is: cmpgnr.com
Follow the directions below to update your email "trusted sender" list
On October 27, 2006, our outsourced mail server for all eNews from CAPcentral.org was replaced with a new server at: cmpgnr.com
How Does This Affect You?
Some email programs and service providers treat us as "spam" because our eNews goes out to a group of users and is not sent via our in-house email. Thus, as a recipient of any eNews from CCAP, you may need to add the new domain name to your "trusted sender lists," or use the "personal whitelisting" features of your email service provider, so as not to lose track of the most recent eNews, such as the Weekly Case Summaries, Panel eNews, or other announcements that you now receive. To do this, we recommend that you include our "from email address" and the new cmpgnr.com domain name to your trusted sender lists and personal whitelists.
Need A Little Help?
If you need further information, please see the whitelisting instructions (PDF link will open in new window) which lists steps for a wide variety of email service software platforms and several ISPs.
We apologize for any inconvenience, but we appreciate your continued interest in using CCAP eNews announcements -- it has proven to be an excellent way of communicating efficiently with our panel and other website users.
A rule 33.3 petition for review should never be filed to preserve search and seizure issues.
Stone v. Powell (1976) 428 U.S. 465 [96 S.Ct. 3037; 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067] precludes federal habeas relief for most Fourth Amendment issues: "[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial." (Id., 428 U.S. at p. 494, footnote omitted.)
Rule 33.3 permits the filing of an abbreviated petition "for the sole purpose of exhausting state remedies before presenting a claim for federal habeas relief." Filing a petition under this rule requires counsel to state in the petition that the case presents no grounds for review. Since Stone permits no federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims, the petition is appellant's last shot at relief, and a standard petition for review in compliance with rule 28 should be filed instead.
Ordinarily, for both the Third and Fifth District Courts of Appeal, appointed attorneys need to file motions to expand their appointments to seek compensation for all writ petition work, including both habeas corpus and certiorari.
Good news! In light of the U.S. Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Cunningham v. California (Apr. 18, 2005, A103501) unpublished opinion, cert. granted 2/21/06 (05-6551), both of our courts have agreed not to require counsel to file the motion to expand the appointment if appointed counsel can prepare a Cunningham petition for cert. in 4.0 hours or less. If at any point before or during the preparation of the petition and related activity counsel believes that 4.0 hours may not be sufficient time to complete the petition for cert., a motion to expand should be submitted as soon as possible directly to the Court of Appeal. The expansion motion must include 1) an explanation for the need for more time, and 2) an indication of how many hours are needed. The 4.0 hours includes not only the petition, but also the time for obtaining the In Forma Pauperis declaration from the appellant (required to avoid having to pay a filing fee for which counsel would not be reimbursed).
>> View the Cunningham Page for a checklist of procedural steps to filing a petition for certiorari, a simplified Cunningham "Me Too" cert. petition, the IFP affidavit, and other samples and links.
CCAP has learned that some attorneys are using certificates of word length that do not comply with the Rules of Court. CCAP has now posted a sample proper format on our Motions Samples Page . Code of Civil Procedure, section 2015.5 sets forth the requirements for certificates required by any rules. They must be executed under penalty of perjury.
Without compliance, your briefs or petitions may be rejected by the courts, so be sure to include a proper certificate whenever required.
The Fifth District appreciates a courtesy telephone call to the clerk as soon as possible whenever parties engage in negotiations which might affect the progress of a case, such as a stipulation for reversal of judgment, or anything else which might affect the finality of the case. The clerk will ask counsel to submit a follow-up letter. While this advisement may not change the court's workflow on a given case, it is regarded as a helpful notification to court staff. Give them a call!
This procedure for the Fifth District Court of Appeal has been added to our online comparison chart: Procedural Policies of the Third vs. Fifth