Appellant failed to overcome the official-duty evidentiary presumption (Evid. Code, § 664) that a sobriety checkpoint was properly operated. Appellant challenged his drunk driving conviction by arguing that the sobriety checkpoint where he was caught was unconstitutional. In order for a sobriety checkpoint to pass constitutional muster, it must substantially comply with the criteria listed in Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321, which include: (1) decision making at the supervisory level; (2) limits on discretion of field officers as to who is to be stopped; (3) maintenance of safety conditions; (4) reasonable location of the checkpoint; (5) a reasonable time and duration of the checkpoint; (6) indicia of the official nature of the roadblock; (7) the length and nature of the detention; and (8) advance publicity regarding each checkpoint. Appellant said supervisory decision making for the checkpoint and the reasonableness of the location had not been met because the media advisory provided the wrong block of the street on which the checkpoint was to be set up. But the court found that despite this discrepancy, the record showed that it was not an individual police officer that decided the location, but rather the traffic division of the police department. And appellant’s claim that the DMV presented no evidence regarding the neutrality of selection process for cars to be stopped was also not supported because the evidence adduced at the hearing showed that each of the 519 cars that drove through the checkpoint was stopped. Appellant failed to meet his burden of showing that the official duty of setting up and operating the checkpoint was not regularly performed.