Appellant was the father of the minor child in question, and was not offered reunification services in this dependency proceeding pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10)(b), (prior termination of parental rights). On appeal, he argued that the bypass provisions did not apply to him because he was not a presumed father, and therefore not a “parent” in the prior proceedings. The appellate court here denied fathers extraordinary writ. The bypass provisions can be applied to a father whose parental rights to a sibling or half-sibling were terminated while his status in the previous dependency proceedings was that of an alleged or biological father. The term “parent” as used in the bypass provisions refers to the status in the current proceedings. The bypass provisions can also apply to a parent who was not the custodial parent of the sibling or half-sibling. Further, there was sufficient evidence here to support the juvenile courts determination that father had not made reasonable efforts to treat the problems which had led to the removal of the siblings, and therefore sufficient evidence to support the decision to bypass reunification services.