The juvenile court was not required to make an express finding of the degree of murder where the accusatory pleading specifically charged first degree. The minor argued on appeal that the juvenile court’s failure to expressly state whether the murder he committed was first or second degree should result in an order that it was second degree. The minor relied on Penal Code sections 1192 and 1157, both of which have been held applicable to delinquency proceedings. The appellate court noted, however, that the statutes do not apply where an accusatory pleading does not charge a crime distinguished or divided into degrees. (See People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896; Sanchez v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1266.) Because the petition in this case specified that the minor committed a willful, deliberate, and premeditated first degree murder, it did not define a crime divided into degrees. As such, an express declaration of the degree of the crime was not required.