Where father’s notice of appeal explicitly stated it was from the 366.26 hearing, the appellate court could not liberally construe it to review an earlier order denying father’s 388 petition. Father’s 388 petition was denied on January, 22, 2019. Father’s parental rights were terminated on March 7, 2019. Father filed a notice of appeal the same day, indicating that the appeal was from the order terminating parental rights. On appeal, father argued that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it summarily denied the January 388 petition. The appellate court found that it lacked jurisdiction to address the merits of father’s argument. Father did not actually appeal from the order denying the 388 petition, and the notice of appeal from the 366.26 hearing cannot be liberally construed to embrace that order. The policy of liberally construing a notice of appeal in favor of its sufficiency does not apply if the notice is so specific it cannot be read as reaching a judgment or order not mentioned at all. Here, the notice of appeal made no mention of the January 22 order, and expressly stated that the appeal was from the order terminating parental rights. Even though father properly appealed from the termination order, his brief provided no arguments whatsoever as to the termination of parental rights, but only argued that the 388 petition was improperly denied. Therefore, his challenge to the order terminating his parental rights is deemed waived, and the order affirmed.