Death judgment reversed because the DA’s comparison of defendant to a Bengal tiger constituted a prejudicial violation of the RJA. The RJA was not violated when an expert testified about tendencies among racially or ethnically organized gangs, nor when the DA commented on defendant’s dress and demeanor. However, as the AG conceded, the comparison of the defendant to a Bengal tiger, along with references to the defendant using “thug” as an epithet, were an implicit appeal to racial bias, violating the RJA. For judgments entered before the RJA’s effective date, whether by petition or direct appeal, the error requires reversal unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; here, the AG conceded prejudice, and the Court agreed. The Court rejected a categorical rule prohibiting death penalty retrials under the RJA as constitutionally problematic.

Other holdings: 1) defendant’s motion to represent himself did not trigger the trial court’s duty to advise on substituting counsel; 2) ex parte hearings held without defendant’s presence were largely administrative, not substantially related to his defense, and any error was harmless; 3) claims related to jury voir dire were forfeited, but courts are discouraged from asking jurors only to state if they had a different answer than previous jurors, rather than questioning each prospective juror individually; 4) hearsay errors regarding defendant’s gang affiliation and past arrests were harmless; 5) claims regarding gang experts’ qualifications were forfeited; and 6) the decision not to sever an assault charge was within the trial court’s discretion. [Editor’s Note: Justice Liu concurred, writing separately to address the RJA analysis. Justice Evans concurred only in the judgment, finding the majority’s analysis dilutes the RJA and writing separately to explain how the RJA is intended to operate.]

The full opinion is available on the court’s website here: https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S044739.PDF