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Name: People v. Fernandez
Case #: F071338
Court: CA Court of Appeal
District 5 DCA
Opinion Date: 05/19/2017

Trial court erred by finding defendant’s juvenile adjudication rendered him ineligible for Proposition 47 relief without considering whether the conditions set forth in Penal Code section 667, subdivision (d)(3) were satisfied. Fernandez filed Proposition 47 petitions to have two felony convictions reduced to misdemeanors. The court denied the petitions, reasoning that Fernandez was ineligible due to a juvenile adjudication for a violation of section 288, subdivision (b)(1) and a violation of section 288. Fernandez appealed. Held: Reversed and remanded. Individuals are ineligible for Proposition 47 relief if they have a prior conviction for an offense listed in section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv) or are required to register pursuant to section 290. (Pen. Code, § 1170.18, subd. (i).) For most purposes, a juvenile adjudication does not qualify as a conviction. However, section 667, subdivision (d)(3) provides that juvenile adjudications qualify as convictions for purposes of section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) if four circumstances are met. Applying principles of statutory interpretation and agreeing with People v. Sledge (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1089, the court concluded Proposition 47 incorporates this treatment of juvenile adjudications. Thus, a prior juvenile adjudication may constitute a disqualifying prior conviction within the meaning of section 1170.18, subdivision (i) if the four conditions set forth in section 667, subdivision (d)(3) are satisfied. Here, Fernandez’s adjudication for a violation of section 288, subdivision (b)(1) did not render him ineligible for relief because it occurred before he turned 16 and therefore did not satisfy section 667, subdivision (d)(3). Additionally, a juvenile adjudication for an offense listed in section 290 does not require registration pursuant to the section. Because the record was unclear as to whether Fernandez’s other juvenile adjudication satisfied section 667, subdivision (d)(3), remand was required.

The full opinion is available on the court’s website here: