The trial court properly admitted two manuscripts seized from the residence which described operation of a prostitution enterprise. The manuscripts were properly authenticated, and their potential for prejudice did not outweigh their probative value. In a prosecution for pimping, in violation of Penal Code section 266h, subdivision (a), appellant was not harmed by the prosecution’s failure to include the solicitation portion of the definition of the offense in the information. The evidence presented at both the preliminary hearing and at trial clearly gave appellant adequate notice of the charges against her. In a prosecution for pimping, the trial court did not err by failing to give an instruction as to the lesser-included offense of aiding and abetting prostitution. The evidence showed appellant derived support from the earnings of prostitutes, and solicited compensation for the solicitation of prostitutes. She failed to show that she was guilty only of a lesser offense; the only possible offense she committed was that of pimping. The imposition of a mandatory three-year prison sentence for pimping did not constitute cruel and/or unusual punishment. Appellant’s sentence was not so disproportionate to the offense as to rise to the level of cruel and/or unusual, and the statute allowed for probation in unusual cases, which the court correctly found that this was not. The information in an affidavit supporting a search warrant was not stale where law enforcement surveillance over a four-month period established evidence of a continuing criminal (prostitution) enterprise at appellant’s residence, which was the subject of the warrant. Probable cause existed to believe that appellant still resided at the residence at the time of the issuance of the warrant, three months later. Appellant was not entitled to a hearing under Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154, to challenge the veracity of the affidavit because there was no showing that the affidavit contained false allegations.