An assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury may be committed without the personal infliction of great bodily harm and the personal use of a firearm. The evidence of appellant’s prior conviction for that offense, alleged in this action as a “three strikes” prior, was insufficient to establish that appellant had personally inflicted great bodily harm or had personally used a firearm. As a result, the offense was not shown to be a serious felony for purposes of the “three strikes” law. Remand was not necessary however, because the sentence imposed, summary probation with one year in county jail, with probation to be terminated upon completion of the jail term, automatically converted the crime to a misdemeanor pursuant to Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b)(1). It necessarily follows that the prior conviction was not a “strike” within the meaning of the “three strikes” law. The Court of Appeal vacated the “strike” finding and remanded for resentencing at which time the prosecution could request that a parole revocation fine be imposed and suspended pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.45.