CALCRIM No. 1170 adequately defines the “residence” element of Penal Code section 290; and the definition of residence in Penal Code section 290.01, subdivision (g) is not unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous. Appellant registered as a sex offender at one location in Fontana but evidence presented at trial indicated that he spent considerable time at a second address and that he had not registered this second address. Appellant was convicted of failure to register under Penal Code section 290, subdivision (g)(2). On appeal, he argued that CALCRIM No. 1170 inadequately defined the “residence” element of the registration statute. The instruction requires proof that defendant knows of the duty to register every residence in which defendant regularly resides regardless of the number of days and nights he spends there. The court disagreed with appellant, finding that the meaning of the term “residence” as defined in Penal Code section 290.011, subdivision (g) is a commonly understood term and, as such, does not require a separate sua sponte definition by the court. The court also found that the definition of “residence” in Penal Code section 290.011, subdivision (g) is not unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous as it is the common meaning of residence understandable by the average person or law enforcement agency.