Pimping statute does not violate a defendant’s right of association by prohibiting him from living with and deriving support from the earnings of a known prostitute. Appellant was convicted of pimping his girlfriend, with whom he lived and whose earnings paid his expenses. The Court of Appeal rejected appellant’s claim the pimping statute violates due process by infringing on the freedom of association. The court found the restrictions the pimping statute imposes on commercial sexual conduct does not violate a defendant’s personal interests and therefore does not implicate fundamental constitutional protections. The statute proscribes deriving a living from the earnings of a prostitute or from money loaned to a prostitute. Any personal interest one might have in non-commercial consensual private activity would not extend to third parties, such as a defendant who is charged with pimping. The statutory proscription against deriving support from the earnings of a known prostitute is rationally related to a legitimate legislative goal of suppressing an offense which affects the health and morals of the public.