There was no bar to ordering direct restitution to the victim following retrial because of the legal doctrines of waiver, estoppel, or laches. There is no statute of limitations on victim restitution, and estoppel would defeat the public policy considerations. There was no change in appellant’s position due to the delay which would have supported an estoppel argument. The double jeopardy provisions of the California Constitution do not prohibit a trial court from imposing, for the first time, a direct restitution order to a victim following retrial after appeal. Although the California Supreme Court held in People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, that double jeopardy provisions prohibited a trial court from increasing a statutorily-mandated restitution fine following retrial, the doctrinal basis of Hanson is that a defendant should not face increased punishment for having successfully appealed the initial conviction. Victim restitution is qualitatively different than a fine. It is not expressly and statutorily defined as punishment, and it is enforceable as a civil judgment. The purpose is compensation to the victim. The Legislature intended victim restitution as a civil remedy rather than as a criminal punishment. Therefore, because direct restitution to a victim is not a punishment, imposition of a restitution order following retrial does not violate double jeopardy principles. Dissenting opinion by J. Poche held that victim restitution under Penal Code section 1202.4 is both so punitive in purpose and effect as to render it criminal punishment.