The trial court should have awarded additional credits under Penal Code section 2900.5.Appellant argued that his continued incarceration after his earliest possible release date was attributable only to the charges in the instant case, so he was entitled to credits for that time served to be applied to the sentence in this case. Appellant’s prison chronology history showed his continued custody was solely attributable to the case. Citing People v. Bruner (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1178, the court awarded him credits for that time.
Amended Penal Code section 4019 is not retroactive. The appellate court upheld the denial of a request for additional credits under revised section 4019. The amendment to the statute does not necessarily lessen punishment. The statute permits a defendant to earn additional conduct credits, they are not automatically awarded as are custody credits. So, In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, does not apply. Prospective application of the statute is not inconsistent with the legislative intent of addressing the State’s fiscal crisis because money will still be saved, just less of it. And the court found it significant that another part of SB 18 which amended credits under section 2933.3 had an express retroactivity clause.
Prospective application of amended section 4019 does not violate equal protection. In considering an equal protection challenge to prospective application of the amendment, the court once again noted section 4019 is meant to motivate good conduct. In re Kapperman (1974) 11 Cal.3d 542, is therefore inapplicable because that case involved custody credits. Likewise, In re Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498 is not helpful because, although it dealt with section 4019, the disparate treatment was based on a defendant’s status as a misdemeanant or a felon, whereas the distinction here is temporal.