Remand was required where trial court did not explain what information in the record of an inmate’s prior convictions justified denying his request for resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act. Manning was sentenced to 25 years to life under the Three Strikes Law for a commercial burglary with two prior serious felony convictions. Following the enactment of Proposition 36, Manning filed a petition asking the trial court to recall his sentence and resentence him as a second striker pursuant to the Act. The trial court denied his petition on the grounds that Manning had a prior conviction for an offense listed in Penal Code section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv), making him ineligible for resentencing. On appeal, Manning contended that the trial court erred because his two prior convictions for rape of an unconscious person (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(4)) are not enumerated excluding offenses nor violent sex offenses within the meaning of Penal Code section 1170.126. Held: Remanded for further proceedings. The elements of a conviction for rape of an unconscious person do not establish that it is a disqualifying offense under 1170.126, subdivision (e)(3). However, a trial court may look at the entire record of conviction to determine whether a non-disqualifying prior offense involved conduct that renders an inmate ineligible for resentencing under section 1170.126. Here, the appellate court could not be certain what materials the trial court considered before denying the petition, or what its precise reasoning was for finding Manning ineligible for resentencing. Therefore, remand was required to allow both Manning and the prosecutor to demonstrate that the offenses either did or did not involve disqualifying conduct. Further, the trial court must specify the records it relied on and reasons for concluding that the prior offenses were or were not disqualifying.