Appellant was convicted of stalking, and it was also found that she had previously been convicted of stalking within the meaning of Penal Code section 646.9, subdivision (c)(2). On appeal, she argued that as an indigent defendant, she was entitled to a free transcript of the prior stalking trial for purposes of preparing for the second trial, and that the failure to obtain a transcript deprived her of her constitutional right to a fair trial, to impeach witnesses, and to decide whether to testify. The appellate court rejected the argument and affirmed. Although equal protection principles require the government to supply a free transcript of proceedings to an indigent defendant, these principles are not implicated when a defendant seeks the transcript for use in a later trial. Appellant was neither entitled to transcripts of her previous trial, nor did she demonstrate a particularized need for them. Nor did she show why the prior testimony would have assisted her in impeaching the victim. Even if the court erred in failing to order the transcript, there was no prejudice. On this record, appellant could not show that her inability to impeach the victim with his prior testimony would have produced a significantly different impression of his credibility. However, the trial court erred in imposing sentences under both sections 646.9, subdivision (a), and 646.9, subdivision (c)(2). The sections provide for alternative sentences, and therefore remand was required.