The trial court did not err here in rejecting the jury instruction proffered by appellant, which cautioned the jury that it must find the defendant more likely than not to reoffend. The focus upon percentages rather than upon the totality of the evidence was argumentative, and would have tended to derogate, rather than amplify, the high burden of proof which must be met in a Sexually Violent Predators Act case. The statutory phrase “likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior” is not a standard of proof, but a prediction of dangerousness that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The experts here relied on the RRASOR test, which statistically predicted appellant’s probability of reoffending at below 50%, but opined that the test understated this probability. Moreover, one of the two prosecution experts explicitly refused to opine that it was “more likely than not” that appellant would reoffend. Nonetheless, the standard of proof, as defined here, was satisfied.