Trial court may not modify an integral condition to a plea agreement following the entry of judgment. Segura entered into a negotiated plea disposition where he pleaded no contest to a felony offense in exchange for the dismissal of a prior conviction and a promise of probation with 365 days to be served in jail. During the plea colloquy, Segura acknowledged that if he were not a citizen of the United States, the one-year jail term could trigger deportation. When deportation proceedings were initiated, Segura applied to the trial court to reduce his jail term to 360 days, effective nunc pro tunc. The trial court denied the request, ruling that it did not have the discretion to modify a sentence prescribed pursuant to plea agreement. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the trial court possessed continuing jurisdiction during the probationary period and the authority to modify or revoke probation, including the term of confinement. The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether a prescribed jail term which constitutes a material provision of a plea agreement including a grant of probation may be modified by the trial court in its exercise of discretion to modify or revoke probation. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The trial court’s statutory authority to modify conditions of probation did not extend to modifying a material term of a plea agreement that granted the privilege of probation subject to the service of a specified jail term. Segura was granted probation, for which he would otherwise have been ineligible, in exchange for entering into a plea agreement which included a specified time period in the county jail. He knowingly and voluntarily accepted the terms of that agreement. The trial court properly recognized it was not at liberty to modify a condition integral to the granting of probation.