The protective order provision of Penal Code section 1203.097, subdivision (a)(2) applies only to those persons described in (a) through (f) of subdivision (a)(2) of the statute. Appellant was arrested for threatening and harassing his former girlfriend, Reyes, and her boyfriend, Huck, and for vandalizing both their cars. During the pendancy of the proceeding the court issued criminal orders pursuant to Penal Code section 136.2 on the behalf of Reyes and Huck, but at sentencing modified the order as to Huck , imposing it as a condition of probation under the authority of Penal Code section 1203.097. The order as to both parties was correctly imposed pursuant to section 136.2, the purpose of this statute being to allow participation in criminal proceedings without reprisal. But the post-trial probation condition directing no contact as to Huck was unauthorized as the court imposed it pursuant to section 1203.097 and Huck was not a protected party. Pursuant to section 1203.1, the trial court does have authority to impose a stay away order as a condition of probation under its broad discretion. Accordingly, the appellate court struck the protective order as imposed but remanded the matter to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion to impose the stay away order as a condition of probation.