The ability to remain in one location is not required to establish residence for purposes of sex offender registration. Appellant was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender. On appeal, he contended that there was insufficient evidence because he had not established a residence prior to his arrest. After his release on parole, he was staying at a friend’s house where he could not remain, and then stayed at a mission where he also could not remain as a registered sex offender. The appellate court rejected his argument. There is no authority for the proposition that a person “is residing” in a given jurisdiction only when staying at an address which will remain open to him. There was sufficient evidence that appellant was “residing” in Madera when he returned there upon his release from parole, and he was therefore required to register within five working days.
[Editor’s note: Appellant was not tried under the current statute for registration of transients (Pen. Code, sec. 290.011), which was enacted after the offenses here. The version of the statute in effect at the time of the offense was former section 290, subdivsion (a)(1)(C).]