A two-year delay between indictment in the local Guam court and indictment in federal district court did not violate appellant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. Without deciding whether the clock should run from indictment in the Guam court or in the federal district court, and applying the four-part test stated in Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, the court found there was no Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation. Even if the delay was inappropriately long, the reasons were due in part because of the many motions filed by appellant, his changes in attorneys, and his waivers and subsequent reassertions of his speedy trial right. And there was no prejudice resulting from the delay. The trial court did not err in concluding there was reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop that led to appellant’s arrest. Officers investigating a robbery committed ten minutes earlier, stopped appellant’s car because it was driving on the otherwise-deserted road leading from the crime scene, and because they smelled burning fluid which suggested the car had been driven fast. Although “the facts here are close” under a totality of the circumstances they present reasonable suspicion for the stop.