In this second appeal, the federal appellate court reversed a direct restitution order imposed under the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663, 3664, and remanded for further proceedings on the calculation of direct restitution. The defendant had been an owner and chairman of the board of a savings and loan. He had been convicted of many offenses, and in the first appeal, his convictions of four counts of self-dealing by an officer of a federally insured bank (18 U.S.C. § 1006), four counts of making false entries in bank records (18 U.S.C. § 1006), and two counts of making false statements to influence the Federal Savings and Loan Corporation (18 U.S.C. § 1008 [now repealed.]) were upheld. On the remand following that appeal, the trial court imposed $1.5 million of restitution under a theory of “lost corporate opportunities.” In this appeal, the federal appellate court found that only the direct losses of the savings and loan could be the subject of direct restitution under VWPA. As to two transactions (Cinnebar and Marina deals), the savings and loan’s expectation was only in receiving interest as a result of loans, which it had in fact received. There was no basis for awarding any further direct restitution. As to the Lick Avenue transaction, the restitution order was reversed to the extent that it was based on a theory of “lost corporate opportunity” but remanded for a determination as to whether the savings and loan had lost any vested property interest in the transaction as the result of a conversion of the defendant to his own personal use. As to the Continental Can deal, the court found the direct restitution in the amount of $200,000 was correct, as the defendant had appropriated the a fee in this amount that had belonged to Saratoga.