Gudino was convicted of being in the United States after having been deported. Officers questioned Gudino and asked for identification based solely on the fact that he was Hispanic and spoke poor English, thinking he might be an illegal alien. On appeal, he argued that the evidence of his identity should have been suppressed because it was the result of an unconstitutional stop. Gudino conceded that ordinarily when an illegal arrest leads only to disclosure of identity, the identity cannot be suppressed, but argued that since this stop was founded solely on Gudino’s Hispanic appearance, it was an egregious enough Fourth Amendment violation so that the ordinary rule should not apply. The appellate court disagreed and affirmed the denial of Gudino’s suppression motion. Identity evidence is inherently different from other kinds of evidence. The simple fact of who a defendant is cannot be excluded, regardless of the nature of the violation leading to his identity. To hold otherwise in this case would be to allow appellant to continue in the commission of an ongoing crime, being present in the United States after being deported.