In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal conditionally reversed and remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the California Indian Child Welfare Act (Cal-ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Social Services/Child Welfare Services failed to comply with ICWA’s and Cal-ICWA's inquiry and notice…
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal conditionally reversed and remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the California Indian Child Welfare Act (Cal-ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Social Services/Child Welfare Services failed to comply with ICWA’s and Cal-ICWA's inquiry and notice requirements.
Following transfer from the California Supreme Court with directions to reconsider in light of People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671, the Court of Appeal held (1) the trial court erred by summarily denying appellant's Penal Code section 1172.6 petition on the ground it was successive, as the petition rested on new legal authority (Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)), and (2) the record of conviction does not establish that appellant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law, as the jury was instructed on the former felony-murder rule but did not make a specific finding that she…
Following transfer from the California Supreme Court with directions to reconsider in light of People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671, the Court of Appeal held (1) the trial court erred by summarily denying appellant's Penal Code section 1172.6 petition on the ground it was successive, as the petition rested on new legal authority (Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)), and (2) the record of conviction does not establish that appellant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law, as the jury was instructed on the former felony-murder rule but did not make a specific finding that she aided and abetted in the killing itself. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.
In an appeal from the juvenile court's order terminating mother's reunification services, the Court of Appeal agreed with mother that the agency failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act's (ICWA) inquiry requirements, because the record did not show that the agency asked the child's stepmother, an extended family member in contact with the agency, about possible Indian ancestry. The Court of Appeal vacated the juvenile court's finding that ICWA does not apply and remanded for the agency and the juvenile court to comply with the inquiry provisions of ICWA and California…
In an appeal from the juvenile court's order terminating mother's reunification services, the Court of Appeal agreed with mother that the agency failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act's (ICWA) inquiry requirements, because the record did not show that the agency asked the child's stepmother, an extended family member in contact with the agency, about possible Indian ancestry. The Court of Appeal vacated the juvenile court's finding that ICWA does not apply and remanded for the agency and the juvenile court to comply with the inquiry provisions of ICWA and California law.
The Court of Appeal found that the trial court prejudicially erred in resentencing appellant in his absence and without a valid waiver of his right to be present. The case was remanded for…
The Court of Appeal found that the trial court prejudicially erred in resentencing appellant in his absence and without a valid waiver of his right to be present. The case was remanded for resentencing.
On remand from the California Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the trial court applied the wrong standard at the evidentiary hearing on his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), required the court to act as an independent factfinder and determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether appellant was guilty of murder under current law. The Court of Appeal also agreed that the error was prejudicial, because there was a reasonable probability that a properly functioning factfinder could have rejected both theories. It reversed the order denying the petition and…
On remand from the California Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the trial court applied the wrong standard at the evidentiary hearing on his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), required the court to act as an independent factfinder and determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether appellant was guilty of murder under current law. The Court of Appeal also agreed that the error was prejudicial, because there was a reasonable probability that a properly functioning factfinder could have rejected both theories. It reversed the order denying the petition and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing.
In an appeal from orders finding a probation violation and sentencing appellant to two years in county jail, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to find she violated probation after her probationary term had expired. The court reversed the orders revoking and terminating probation in both of appellant's cases and vacated the resulting…
In an appeal from orders finding a probation violation and sentencing appellant to two years in county jail, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to find she violated probation after her probationary term had expired. The court reversed the orders revoking and terminating probation in both of appellant's cases and vacated the resulting sentences.
The Court of Appeal vacated a victim restitution award (Pen. Code, § 1202,4, subd. (f)) to the victim’s sister due to the absence of supporting…
The Court of Appeal vacated a victim restitution award (Pen. Code, § 1202,4, subd. (f)) to the victim’s sister due to the absence of supporting evidence.
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that Penal Code section 654 barred separate punishment for his false imprisonment conviction and one of his domestic violence convictions. Because section 654 now gives the trial court discretion to choose which term to impose, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for a full…
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that Penal Code section 654 barred separate punishment for his false imprisonment conviction and one of his domestic violence convictions. Because section 654 now gives the trial court discretion to choose which term to impose, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for a full resentencing.
The Court of Appeal found that the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant's request for mental health diversion because its finding that he was ineligible was not supported by substantial evidence. The trial court’s speculation about appellant’s gang motivation for committing the offense was not evidence "'from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable’” that his mental health disorders were not a causal, motivating, or contributing factor in the offense. (Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 401-402.) The matter was conditionally reversed and remanded for reconsideration of appellant’s application for mental health…
The Court of Appeal found that the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant's request for mental health diversion because its finding that he was ineligible was not supported by substantial evidence. The trial court’s speculation about appellant’s gang motivation for committing the offense was not evidence "'from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable’” that his mental health disorders were not a causal, motivating, or contributing factor in the offense. (Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 401-402.) The matter was conditionally reversed and remanded for reconsideration of appellant’s application for mental health diversion.
In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the juvenile court and the department failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Thus, the Court of Appeal vacated the finding that ICWA did not apply and remanded for further ICWA compliance…
In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the juvenile court and the department failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Thus, the Court of Appeal vacated the finding that ICWA did not apply and remanded for further ICWA compliance proceedings.
The Court of Appeal found that:
(1) there were prejudicial instructional errors regarding the multiple-murder (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and lying-in-wait (id., subd. (a)(15)) special circumstance findings as to counts 1, 2, and 3;
(2) the firearm enhancements found true as to counts 1, 2 and 3 (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)) must be reversed due to prejudicial error, including pleading deficiencies and insufficiency of the evidence;
and,
(3) the trial court erred by denying appellant's renewed motion for a transfer hearing in juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 as amended by Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)…
The Court of Appeal found that:
(1) there were prejudicial instructional errors regarding the multiple-murder (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and lying-in-wait (id., subd. (a)(15)) special circumstance findings as to counts 1, 2, and 3;
(2) the firearm enhancements found true as to counts 1, 2 and 3 (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)) must be reversed due to prejudicial error, including pleading deficiencies and insufficiency of the evidence;
and,
(3) the trial court erred by denying appellant's renewed motion for a transfer hearing in juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 as amended by Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 2361).
The Court of Appeal reversed the special circumstance findings and firearm enhancements, and conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the matter with directions to refer the case to the juvenile court for a transfer hearing under current law.
If the juvenile court determines transfer to adult criminal court is not warranted, the juvenile court shall conduct further proceedings under the juvenile law. If the juvenile court determines transfer is warranted, the matter shall be returned to the criminal court. In that event, the prosecution may retry the special circumstance allegations of multiple-murder and lying in wait, but the firearm enhancements shall remain stricken, as retrial on those allegations is barred by principles of double jeopardy. The adult criminal court shall then resentence appellant after any further proceedings.
In this appeal from an order transferring minor from juvenile court to criminal court, the Court of Appeal agreed with minor that there was insufficient evidence to support the lower court's findings regarding his ability to be rehabilitated within the two-year period the juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over him given his age and the success of previous rehabilitation attempts. (Welf. & Ins. Code, § 707, subds. (a)(3)(B), (D).) The matter was remanded for further proceedings, to include an updated transfer report that comports with section 707, and any relevant post-transfer hearing evidence. (Id., subds. (a)(1),…
In this appeal from an order transferring minor from juvenile court to criminal court, the Court of Appeal agreed with minor that there was insufficient evidence to support the lower court's findings regarding his ability to be rehabilitated within the two-year period the juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction over him given his age and the success of previous rehabilitation attempts. (Welf. & Ins. Code, § 707, subds. (a)(3)(B), (D).) The matter was remanded for further proceedings, to include an updated transfer report that comports with section 707, and any relevant post-transfer hearing evidence. (Id., subds. (a)(1), (3).)
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the lying-in-wait special circumstance (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(15)). Thus, the Court of Appeal vacated the lying-in-wait special circumstance finding and affirmed the judgment in all other…
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the lying-in-wait special circumstance (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(15)). Thus, the Court of Appeal vacated the lying-in-wait special circumstance finding and affirmed the judgment in all other respects.
In an appeal from a juvenile wardship order, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's true finding that he committed conspiracy to commit assault with a firearm. As a result, the Court of Appeal reversed the true finding on the conspiracy…
In an appeal from a juvenile wardship order, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's true finding that he committed conspiracy to commit assault with a firearm. As a result, the Court of Appeal reversed the true finding on the conspiracy count.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal conditionally reversed and remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the California Indian Child Welfare Act (Cal-ICWA), because the juvenile court and Child Welfare Services Agency failed to comply with ICWA’s and Cal-ICWA's inquiry and notice…
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal conditionally reversed and remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the California Indian Child Welfare Act (Cal-ICWA), because the juvenile court and Child Welfare Services Agency failed to comply with ICWA’s and Cal-ICWA's inquiry and notice requirements.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant's request for mental health diversion, as there was insufficient evidence of an unreasonable risk that appellant will commit a super strike offense if treated in the community. There was no evidence appellant had been previously charged with a super strike offense, and his current offense was not a super strike. Appellant’s criminal history consisted of two nonviolent felonies and four misdemeanor offenses. At the time of the hearing on his application, appellant was doing well in an outpatient program. He had successfully…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant's request for mental health diversion, as there was insufficient evidence of an unreasonable risk that appellant will commit a super strike offense if treated in the community. There was no evidence appellant had been previously charged with a super strike offense, and his current offense was not a super strike. Appellant’s criminal history consisted of two nonviolent felonies and four misdemeanor offenses. At the time of the hearing on his application, appellant was doing well in an outpatient program. He had successfully engaged in a treatment program for six months, he was maintaining housing and a job, he had not reoffended, and his treatment provider recommended appellant continue treatment in the community. The matter was reversed and remanded for a new hearing on appellant’s present suitability for mental health diversion.
In an appeal from the juvenile court's orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the department failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), where the department did not inquire of, or make any record of inquiry of, numerous known maternal and paternal relatives and did not provide the tribes with the information necessary for a membership or citizenship eligibility determination. The Court of Appeal also agreed with appellant that the juvenile court erred by directing father to undertake the ICWA investigation, since the affirmative and continuing duty…
In an appeal from the juvenile court's orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the department failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), where the department did not inquire of, or make any record of inquiry of, numerous known maternal and paternal relatives and did not provide the tribes with the information necessary for a membership or citizenship eligibility determination. The Court of Appeal also agreed with appellant that the juvenile court erred by directing father to undertake the ICWA investigation, since the affirmative and continuing duty of inquiry rests with the juvenile court and the department, not the parents. The orders terminating parental rights were conditionally reversed and the matter remanded for further ICWA proceedings.
In an appeal from a first degree murder conviction, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that the trial court's oral pronouncement of sentence controls over the sentencing minutes and the abstract of judgment. The Court of Appeal ordered the minutes corrected to reflect that the trial court struck the restitution fine under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b), and did not impose the court operations fee (Pen. Code, § 1465.8) or the criminal conviction fee (Gov. Code, § 70373). Rather than simply adding those mandatory assessments to the judgment as respondent requested, the Court of Appeal remanded so that…
In an appeal from a first degree murder conviction, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that the trial court's oral pronouncement of sentence controls over the sentencing minutes and the abstract of judgment. The Court of Appeal ordered the minutes corrected to reflect that the trial court struck the restitution fine under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b), and did not impose the court operations fee (Pen. Code, § 1465.8) or the criminal conviction fee (Gov. Code, § 70373). Rather than simply adding those mandatory assessments to the judgment as respondent requested, the Court of Appeal remanded so that appellant would have the opportunity to request a waiver based on inability to pay, and directed that the abstract be corrected to reflect the trial court's determination on remand.
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the trial court imposed an unauthorized 20-year firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (c), on appellant's conviction for discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 26100, subd. (c)). Section 12022.53 applies only to the felonies enumerated in subdivision (a), and section 26100 is not among them. The court also declined the People's request to modify the sentence by substituting a 10-year enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision (a), because that enhancement does not apply where firearm use is an element of the underlying offense. The court vacated…
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the trial court imposed an unauthorized 20-year firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (c), on appellant's conviction for discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 26100, subd. (c)). Section 12022.53 applies only to the felonies enumerated in subdivision (a), and section 26100 is not among them. The court also declined the People's request to modify the sentence by substituting a 10-year enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision (a), because that enhancement does not apply where firearm use is an element of the underlying offense. The court vacated appellant's sentence and remanded for a full resentencing.
In an appeal from the juvenile court's orders issued at a six-month review hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (e), which denied return of mother's four children and continued them in out-of-home placement, appellate counsel obtained a stipulated reversal. In a prior appeal, the underlying disposition order removing the children had been reversed and remanded for a new disposition hearing; in light of that decision, mother's counsel and the department jointly stipulated that the six-month review orders should likewise be reversed. The Court of Appeal accepted the stipulation, reversed the orders as to mother, and remanded for…
In an appeal from the juvenile court's orders issued at a six-month review hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (e), which denied return of mother's four children and continued them in out-of-home placement, appellate counsel obtained a stipulated reversal. In a prior appeal, the underlying disposition order removing the children had been reversed and remanded for a new disposition hearing; in light of that decision, mother's counsel and the department jointly stipulated that the six-month review orders should likewise be reversed. The Court of Appeal accepted the stipulation, reversed the orders as to mother, and remanded for a new disposition hearing, directing that the remittitur issue immediately
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that appellant's conviction for assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)) must be vacated because it is a lesser-included offense of his conviction for assault with a semi-automatic firearm (§ 245, subd.…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that appellant's conviction for assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)) must be vacated because it is a lesser-included offense of his conviction for assault with a semi-automatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)).
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that he received one less day of custody credit than he was entitled to, and modified the judgment…
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that he received one less day of custody credit than he was entitled to, and modified the judgment accordingly.
In an appeal from the juvenile court's order terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal agreed with mother's argument that the juvenile court and the department failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Court of Appeal conditionally reversed the order terminating parental rights and remanded for compliance with ICWA's inquiry…
In an appeal from the juvenile court's order terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal agreed with mother's argument that the juvenile court and the department failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Court of Appeal conditionally reversed the order terminating parental rights and remanded for compliance with ICWA's inquiry requirements.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal held that (1) the juvenile court’s visitation orders improperly delegated to the legal guardian the decision whether appellant would have visits, and (2) the juvenile court and Human Services Agency failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act's (ICWA) inquiry and notice requirements. The matter was conditionally reversed and remanded for the entry of a new visitation order and compliance with the…
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal held that (1) the juvenile court’s visitation orders improperly delegated to the legal guardian the decision whether appellant would have visits, and (2) the juvenile court and Human Services Agency failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act's (ICWA) inquiry and notice requirements. The matter was conditionally reversed and remanded for the entry of a new visitation order and compliance with the ICWA.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of assault a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)). The evidence showed the firearm was unloaded or inoperable at the time of the alleged assault, and the prosecution presented no evidence that appellant nevertheless had the “present ability[] to commit a violent injury on the person of another” with the firearm. (§§ 240, 245, subd. (a)(2).) The Court of Appeal vacated the conviction and remanded the matter for…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of assault a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)). The evidence showed the firearm was unloaded or inoperable at the time of the alleged assault, and the prosecution presented no evidence that appellant nevertheless had the “present ability[] to commit a violent injury on the person of another” with the firearm. (§§ 240, 245, subd. (a)(2).) The Court of Appeal vacated the conviction and remanded the matter for resentencing.
In an appeal from a resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that his restitution fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b) had to be vacated. Because the fine was originally imposed in 2012, more than 10 years before resentencing, section 1465.9, subdivision (d) rendered it unenforceable and required vacatur. The Court of Appeal modified the judgment to vacate the fine and directed the trial court to prepare amended abstracts of…
In an appeal from a resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that his restitution fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b) had to be vacated. Because the fine was originally imposed in 2012, more than 10 years before resentencing, section 1465.9, subdivision (d) rendered it unenforceable and required vacatur. The Court of Appeal modified the judgment to vacate the fine and directed the trial court to prepare amended abstracts of judgment.
In an appeal from a denial of a Penal Code section 1172.6 resentencing petition after an evidentiary hearing, the Third District Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for murder and attempted murder. The matter was remanded with an order for the trial court to vacate the convictions and resentence…
In an appeal from a denial of a Penal Code section 1172.6 resentencing petition after an evidentiary hearing, the Third District Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for murder and attempted murder. The matter was remanded with an order for the trial court to vacate the convictions and resentence appellant.
In an appeal from the juvenile court's orders terminating parental rights as to two children and establishing legal guardianship as to a third, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that the department and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the California Indian Child Welfare Act (Cal-ICWA). The Court of Appeal conditionally reversed and remanded for compliance with ICWA and…
In an appeal from the juvenile court's orders terminating parental rights as to two children and establishing legal guardianship as to a third, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that the department and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the California Indian Child Welfare Act (Cal-ICWA). The Court of Appeal conditionally reversed and remanded for compliance with ICWA and Cal-ICWA.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that in granting his resentencing petition under Penal Code section 1172.75, the trial court should not have reimposed the previously imposed restitution fine, jail classification fee, and booking fee because the fees were unenforceable. As a result, the judgment was modified to strike the…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that in granting his resentencing petition under Penal Code section 1172.75, the trial court should not have reimposed the previously imposed restitution fine, jail classification fee, and booking fee because the fees were unenforceable. As a result, the judgment was modified to strike the fees.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that, given the amendments to Penal Code section 186.22 enacted by Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)(Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3), there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that his prior conviction under section 186.22 qualifies as a serious or violent felony conviction for the purposes of strike prior and prior serious felony enhancement allegations. As a result, the matter was remanded to the trial court for retrial on these…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that, given the amendments to Penal Code section 186.22 enacted by Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)(Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3), there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that his prior conviction under section 186.22 qualifies as a serious or violent felony conviction for the purposes of strike prior and prior serious felony enhancement allegations. As a result, the matter was remanded to the trial court for retrial on these allegations.