In this juvenile wardship appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that he received a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)). The court held that appellant's mere presence as a passenger in the stolen car, without more, did not establish that he possessed or aided in withholding the vehicle from its owner; no evidence showed he exercised dominion and control over the car or took any affirmative action to aid and abet its receipt. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment as to that…
In this juvenile wardship appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that insufficient evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that he received a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)). The court held that appellant's mere presence as a passenger in the stolen car, without more, did not establish that he possessed or aided in withholding the vehicle from its owner; no evidence showed he exercised dominion and control over the car or took any affirmative action to aid and abet its receipt. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment as to that count.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)). "A person who violates section 10851 [, subdivision] (a) by taking a car with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession, and who is convicted of that offense on that basis, cannot also be convicted of receiving the same vehicle as stolen property." (People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 876.) The Court of Appeal vacated the conviction and ordered correction of clerical errors in the abstract of…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)). "A person who violates section 10851 [, subdivision] (a) by taking a car with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession, and who is convicted of that offense on that basis, cannot also be convicted of receiving the same vehicle as stolen property." (People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 876.) The Court of Appeal vacated the conviction and ordered correction of clerical errors in the abstract of judgement.
In an appeal from the trial court's denial of appellant's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the record of conviction did not establish his ineligibility for relief as a matter of law. The Court reversed the order denying the petition and remanded with directions to issue an order to show cause and conduct further proceedings under section…
In an appeal from the trial court's denial of appellant's petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the record of conviction did not establish his ineligibility for relief as a matter of law. The Court reversed the order denying the petition and remanded with directions to issue an order to show cause and conduct further proceedings under section 1172.6.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that because her conviction is not enumerated in Health and Safety Code section 11372.5, the $50 fee previously imposed was unauthorized. As a result, the fee was…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that because her conviction is not enumerated in Health and Safety Code section 11372.5, the $50 fee previously imposed was unauthorized. As a result, the fee was stricken.
In an appeal from a conviction for first degree murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his right to due process when it denied him a continuance to investigate and file a motion for new trial after granting his motion for self-representation. The Court of Appeal conditionally affirmed the conviction and sentence and remanded with directions for the trial court to grant a reasonable continuance allowing appellant to investigate and file a new trial motion. If the court grants a…
In an appeal from a conviction for first degree murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his right to due process when it denied him a continuance to investigate and file a motion for new trial after granting his motion for self-representation. The Court of Appeal conditionally affirmed the conviction and sentence and remanded with directions for the trial court to grant a reasonable continuance allowing appellant to investigate and file a new trial motion. If the court grants a new trial, the conviction and sentence will be reversed; if it denies the motion, they will stand.
In an appeal from a resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, the Third District Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that the trial court erred in reimposing a $10,000 restitution fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b). Because the fine was originally imposed over 10 years ago, section 1465.9, subdivision (d) requires that the fine be vacated. The Court of Appeal ordered the trial court to vacate the…
In an appeal from a resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, the Third District Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that the trial court erred in reimposing a $10,000 restitution fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b). Because the fine was originally imposed over 10 years ago, section 1465.9, subdivision (d) requires that the fine be vacated. The Court of Appeal ordered the trial court to vacate the fine.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal conditionally reversed and remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Human Services failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice…
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal conditionally reversed and remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Human Services failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice requirements.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal conditionally affirmed and remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Human Services Agency failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry…
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal conditionally affirmed and remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Human Services Agency failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry requirements.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that a probation condition requiring him to participate and complete general education and mental health counseling "at the discretion of and as directed by probation" violated the separation of powers doctrine. The court struck the condition and remanded for the trial court to determine whether the appellant should participate in education and counseling as a condition of…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that a probation condition requiring him to participate and complete general education and mental health counseling "at the discretion of and as directed by probation" violated the separation of powers doctrine. The court struck the condition and remanded for the trial court to determine whether the appellant should participate in education and counseling as a condition of probation.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b)) and parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45) must be stricken from the minute order and abstract of judgment because the trial court did not orally impose the…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b)) and parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45) must be stricken from the minute order and abstract of judgment because the trial court did not orally impose the fines.
In a People's appeal from a grant of a motion to suppress evidence, the Court of Appeal disagreed that the law enforcement officer’s initial contact with defendant was a consensual encounter that did not trigger scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The judgment was…
In a People's appeal from a grant of a motion to suppress evidence, the Court of Appeal disagreed that the law enforcement officer’s initial contact with defendant was a consensual encounter that did not trigger scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The judgment was affirmed.
The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in denying appellant's Penal Code section 1172.6 petitions as procedurally barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion, as there was a relevant and significant change in the law after his prior petitions were denied. Additionally, appellant made a prima facie showing for relief and nothing in the record of conviction establishes his ineligibility. The matter was remanded with directions to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision…
The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in denying appellant's Penal Code section 1172.6 petitions as procedurally barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion, as there was a relevant and significant change in the law after his prior petitions were denied. Additionally, appellant made a prima facie showing for relief and nothing in the record of conviction establishes his ineligibility. The matter was remanded with directions to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d).
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal conditionally affirmed and remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Community Services Agency failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice…
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal conditionally affirmed and remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Community Services Agency failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice requirements.
In an appeal from a resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, the Third District Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that the trial court erred in reimposing a $10,000 restitution fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b). Because the fine was originally imposed over 10 years ago, section 1465.9, subdivision (d) requires that the fine be vacated. The Court of Appeal vacated the…
In an appeal from a resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, the Third District Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that the trial court erred in reimposing a $10,000 restitution fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b). Because the fine was originally imposed over 10 years ago, section 1465.9, subdivision (d) requires that the fine be vacated. The Court of Appeal vacated the fine.
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that the upper term sentence on his felony vandalism conviction was unlawful because the trial court relied on aggravating factors that had not been found true by a jury, admitted by appellant, or subject to a jury trial waiver. The court explained that under Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821 and People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, any fact beyond the bare fact of a prior conviction that exposes a defendant to harsher punishment must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt unless admitted or waived. The Court…
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that the upper term sentence on his felony vandalism conviction was unlawful because the trial court relied on aggravating factors that had not been found true by a jury, admitted by appellant, or subject to a jury trial waiver. The court explained that under Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821 and People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, any fact beyond the bare fact of a prior conviction that exposes a defendant to harsher punishment must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt unless admitted or waived. The Court of Appeal vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing..
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal conditionally reversed and remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice…
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal conditionally reversed and remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice requirements.
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that the trial court erred in dismissing his recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75. The trial court had ruled appellant ineligible under subdivision (f) of section 1172.75, because appellant's sentence included a term of life without the possibility of parole. The Court of Appeal held that subdivision (f) must be construed conjunctively to exclude from resentencing only those individuals who have been convicted of a qualifying sexually violent offense and sentenced to death or a life term without the possibility of parole. Because appellant was not convicted of a qualifying sexually…
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that the trial court erred in dismissing his recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75. The trial court had ruled appellant ineligible under subdivision (f) of section 1172.75, because appellant's sentence included a term of life without the possibility of parole. The Court of Appeal held that subdivision (f) must be construed conjunctively to exclude from resentencing only those individuals who have been convicted of a qualifying sexually violent offense and sentenced to death or a life term without the possibility of parole. Because appellant was not convicted of a qualifying sexually violent offense, he remains eligible for resentencing. The Court of Appeal reversed the order granting the People's motion to dismiss and remanded for further resentencing proceedings.
In a published opinion, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that Penal Code section 1172.75, subdivision (f), must be construed conjunctively to exclude from resentencing only those individuals who have been convicted of a qualifying sexually violent offense and sentenced to death or a life term without the possibility of parole. Because appellant was not convicted of a qualifying sexually violent offense, he remained eligible for recall and resentencing under section 1172.75 even though his sentence included a term of life without the possibility of parole. The Court of Appeal reversed the order granting the People's motion to…
In a published opinion, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that Penal Code section 1172.75, subdivision (f), must be construed conjunctively to exclude from resentencing only those individuals who have been convicted of a qualifying sexually violent offense and sentenced to death or a life term without the possibility of parole. Because appellant was not convicted of a qualifying sexually violent offense, he remained eligible for recall and resentencing under section 1172.75 even though his sentence included a term of life without the possibility of parole. The Court of Appeal reversed the order granting the People's motion to dismiss resentencing and remanded for further resentencing proceedings.
In a published opinion, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that subdivision (f) of Penal Code section 1172.75 must be construed conjunctively, so that only individuals who have been convicted of a qualifying sexually violent offense and sentenced to death or a term of life without the possibility of parole are excluded from recall and resentencing. Thus, the Court of Appeal concluded that because appellant was not convicted of a qualifying sexually violent offense, he remains eligible for resentencing. The order granting the People's motion to dismiss resentencing was reversed and the matter remanded for further…
In a published opinion, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that subdivision (f) of Penal Code section 1172.75 must be construed conjunctively, so that only individuals who have been convicted of a qualifying sexually violent offense and sentenced to death or a term of life without the possibility of parole are excluded from recall and resentencing. Thus, the Court of Appeal concluded that because appellant was not convicted of a qualifying sexually violent offense, he remains eligible for resentencing. The order granting the People's motion to dismiss resentencing was reversed and the matter remanded for further resentencing proceedings.
Appellant received the middle term of four years for her substantive offense, plus a three-year enhancement for personal infliction of great bodily injury and a one-year enhancement for personal use of a deadly weapon. By law, the existence of multiple enhancements was a mitigating circumstance weighing greatly in favor of dismissing “all enhancements beyond a single enhancement.” (Pen. Code, § 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B).) The Court of Appeal found this sentencing factor was overlooked by defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the court. Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel when her attorney failed to (1) request the dismissal of any enhancements, and…
Appellant received the middle term of four years for her substantive offense, plus a three-year enhancement for personal infliction of great bodily injury and a one-year enhancement for personal use of a deadly weapon. By law, the existence of multiple enhancements was a mitigating circumstance weighing greatly in favor of dismissing “all enhancements beyond a single enhancement.” (Pen. Code, § 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B).) The Court of Appeal found this sentencing factor was overlooked by defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the court. Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel when her attorney failed to (1) request the dismissal of any enhancements, and (2) object when both the probation department and the prosecutor erroneously claimed there were no mitigating circumstances. There is no conceivable rational, tactical explanation for these omissions, and it is reasonably probable appellant would have obtained a better result at sentencing but for counsel’s deficient performance. The matter was remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
Officers searched appellant's home and found a firearm. Appellant was subsequently convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and being a felon in possession of an assault weapon (§ 30605, subd. (a)). The Court of Appeal held the trial court erred in failing to stay one of these convictions under section 654. The matter was remanded for the trial court to resentence appellant and to to stay the sentence on one of the…
Officers searched appellant's home and found a firearm. Appellant was subsequently convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and being a felon in possession of an assault weapon (§ 30605, subd. (a)). The Court of Appeal held the trial court erred in failing to stay one of these convictions under section 654. The matter was remanded for the trial court to resentence appellant and to to stay the sentence on one of the convictions.
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that the true findings on his two prior strike convictions for active participation in a criminal street gang had to be vacated. Because the record of conviction did not establish that those prior convictions, entered before Assembly Bill 333's amendments to Penal Code section 186.22, satisfy the current elements of the statute, the Court vacated the strike findings under People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576. The Court also vacated the sentence in its entirety, and remanded for a full…
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that the true findings on his two prior strike convictions for active participation in a criminal street gang had to be vacated. Because the record of conviction did not establish that those prior convictions, entered before Assembly Bill 333's amendments to Penal Code section 186.22, satisfy the current elements of the statute, the Court vacated the strike findings under People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576. The Court also vacated the sentence in its entirety, and remanded for a full resentencing.
In an appeal from the denial of appellant's Penal Code section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) petition, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that the trial court prejudicially erred at the evidentiary hearing by admitting and relying on a grand jury transcript and police reports. The Court of Appeal vacated the trial court's order denying the petition and remanded for a new evidentiary…
In an appeal from the denial of appellant's Penal Code section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) petition, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that the trial court prejudicially erred at the evidentiary hearing by admitting and relying on a grand jury transcript and police reports. The Court of Appeal vacated the trial court's order denying the petition and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing.
In an appeal from a resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the $5,000 restitution fine imposed under section 1202.4, subdivision (b) must be vacated pursuant to section 1465.9, subdivision (d), which renders restitution fines unenforceable and uncollectible 10 years after…
In an appeal from a resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the $5,000 restitution fine imposed under section 1202.4, subdivision (b) must be vacated pursuant to section 1465.9, subdivision (d), which renders restitution fines unenforceable and uncollectible 10 years after imposition.
In a published opinion, the California Supreme Court agreed with appellant's argument that Penal Code section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3) does not categorically bar resentencing for petitioners who could have raised instructional error challenges on prior direct appeal, and confirmed that section 1172.6's reach extends beyond felony murder and natural and probable consequences theories to any theory under which malice may be imputed. Thus, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal's affirmance and remanded for consideration on the merits of appellant's claim that ambiguous aiding and abetting instructions allowed his jury to convict him of murder without finding that he personally…
In a published opinion, the California Supreme Court agreed with appellant's argument that Penal Code section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3) does not categorically bar resentencing for petitioners who could have raised instructional error challenges on prior direct appeal, and confirmed that section 1172.6's reach extends beyond felony murder and natural and probable consequences theories to any theory under which malice may be imputed. Thus, the Court reversed the Court of Appeal's affirmance and remanded for consideration on the merits of appellant's claim that ambiguous aiding and abetting instructions allowed his jury to convict him of murder without finding that he personally harbored malice, on a theory now invalid because of Senate Bill 1437
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the true findings on his two prior strike convictions must be reversed. The court agreed that the 2014 strike prior, based on a conviction for possession of a short barreled rifle with a gang enhancement, no longer qualifies as a strike under People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, which held that the amendments to the gang statutes made by Assembly Bill 333 apply retroactively to strike allegations. The court also agreed that there was insufficient evidence to support the true finding on the 2010 strike prior for grossly negligent discharge…
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the true findings on his two prior strike convictions must be reversed. The court agreed that the 2014 strike prior, based on a conviction for possession of a short barreled rifle with a gang enhancement, no longer qualifies as a strike under People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, which held that the amendments to the gang statutes made by Assembly Bill 333 apply retroactively to strike allegations. The court also agreed that there was insufficient evidence to support the true finding on the 2010 strike prior for grossly negligent discharge of a firearm, because the People failed to prove appellant personally used the firearm. The Court of Appeal reversed the true findings and remanded for further proceedings.
In an appeal from the juvenile court's order terminating dependency jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the juvenile court abused its discretion by terminating dependency jurisdiction over her as a nonminor dependent on the grounds that it was not in her best interests to remain a dependent of the court. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new hearing consistent with Welfare and Institutions Code section…
In an appeal from the juvenile court's order terminating dependency jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the juvenile court abused its discretion by terminating dependency jurisdiction over her as a nonminor dependent on the grounds that it was not in her best interests to remain a dependent of the court. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new hearing consistent with Welfare and Institutions Code section 391.
In an appeal from the juvenile court's orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellants' argument that the Agency failed to satisfy its duty of further inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). As a result, the Court of Appeal conditionally reversed the orders terminating parental rights, and remanded the matter for the purpose of complying with the inquiry and notice provisions of…
In an appeal from the juvenile court's orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellants' argument that the Agency failed to satisfy its duty of further inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). As a result, the Court of Appeal conditionally reversed the orders terminating parental rights, and remanded the matter for the purpose of complying with the inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA.
In an appeal from a juvenile dependency disposition order, the Court of Appeal agreed that the juvenile court erred in removing four children from their parents' physical custody. The Court of Appeal held that the juvenile court failed to state the facts supporting removal as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (e). The Court of Appeal reversed the disposition order and remanded for a new disposition…
In an appeal from a juvenile dependency disposition order, the Court of Appeal agreed that the juvenile court erred in removing four children from their parents' physical custody. The Court of Appeal held that the juvenile court failed to state the facts supporting removal as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (e). The Court of Appeal reversed the disposition order and remanded for a new disposition hearing.
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal granted appellant's motion to augment the record with documents considered by the juvenile court. Although the motion was untimely, the court noted the importance of ensuring the Department of Human Services' (Department) further inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was proper, adequate and duly diligent.
The court additionally rejected respondent's argument that appellant forfeited his ICWA claims because he failed to object during the proceedings on remand following his prior appeal. The law is clear that the burden of ICWA compliance rests with the juvenile court…
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal granted appellant's motion to augment the record with documents considered by the juvenile court. Although the motion was untimely, the court noted the importance of ensuring the Department of Human Services' (Department) further inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was proper, adequate and duly diligent.
The court additionally rejected respondent's argument that appellant forfeited his ICWA claims because he failed to object during the proceedings on remand following his prior appeal. The law is clear that the burden of ICWA compliance rests with the juvenile court and child welfare agencies, and cannot be shifted to the parents. (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1145–1146.) Further, although “‘dependent children have a critical interest in avoiding unnecessary delays to their long-term placement’” (id. at pp. 1142–1143, quoting In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234, 249), “‘[b]ecause tribes have a right to intervene and even overturn prior judgments for failure to comply with ICWA [citations], the lack of timely and proper inquiry can undermine expeditious resolution and call into doubt the finality of juvenile court orders.’” (Dezi C., supra, at p. 1143, italics added, quoting Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1106–1107.) Concerns of gamesmanship also do not justify application of the forfeiture doctrine, as there appears to be little incentive for parents to engage in such conduct, nor is there much indication that the unlikely concern of gamesmanship outweighs, or is on equal footing with, the critical importance of ensuring an adequate and proper ICWA inquiry. (See Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1149–1150.)
The court agreed with appellant that the juvenile court’s decision to make its ICWA finding without waiting a reasonable amount of time after the final wave of informal notices was sent to tribes was improper. Because the premature ICWA finding was made in conjunction with the termination of parental rights, jurisdictional constraints on the juvenile court’s ability to act should the notices yield actionable information preclude a finding that the error is harmless. The court accordingly conditionally reversed the order terminating appellant’s parental rights and remanded the matter to ensure completion of the further inquiry, in compliance with ICWA and Cal-ICWA. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) The court encouraged the parties to stipulate to the immediate issuance of the remittitur in order to expedite proceedings in the juvenile court.