Based on Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019−2020 Reg. Sess.), which limited the maximum probation term a trial court is authorized to impose for most felony offenses to two years, the court reduced appellant's three year probation term to two years. The court also reversed the trial court's order revoking appellant’s driver’s license, which it is not authorized to do under Vehicle Code section…
Based on Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019−2020 Reg. Sess.), which limited the maximum probation term a trial court is authorized to impose for most felony offenses to two years, the court reduced appellant's three year probation term to two years. The court also reversed the trial court's order revoking appellant’s driver’s license, which it is not authorized to do under Vehicle Code section 13351.5.
Because the trial court partially denied the appellant’s Penal Code section 1170.03 (renumbered to 1172.1) resentencing petition before the enactment of Assembly Bill 1540, which requires the court to apply any changes in law that reduce sentences and created a presumption in favor of resentencing when the request comes from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the Court of Appeal remanded the matter for further proceedings in compliance with the amended…
Because the trial court partially denied the appellant’s Penal Code section 1170.03 (renumbered to 1172.1) resentencing petition before the enactment of Assembly Bill 1540, which requires the court to apply any changes in law that reduce sentences and created a presumption in favor of resentencing when the request comes from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the Court of Appeal remanded the matter for further proceedings in compliance with the amended legislation.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which amended Penal Code section 654 to give trial courts the discretion to choose the count on which to impose punishment (instead of having to choose the one that provided for the longest potential term of imprisonment), retroactively applies to the appellant’s case. The appellant is entitled to a full resentencing. The court further held the trial court’s imposition of a 7-year term (stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654) on an offense with a middle term of 3 years and a high term…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which amended Penal Code section 654 to give trial courts the discretion to choose the count on which to impose punishment (instead of having to choose the one that provided for the longest potential term of imprisonment), retroactively applies to the appellant’s case. The appellant is entitled to a full resentencing. The court further held the trial court’s imposition of a 7-year term (stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654) on an offense with a middle term of 3 years and a high term of 5 years was unauthorized.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that in denying the appellant’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6), the trial court erred in applying a felony murder rule analysis when the appellant was tried for second degree murder as an aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The court remanded the matter for a new…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that in denying the appellant’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6), the trial court erred in applying a felony murder rule analysis when the appellant was tried for second degree murder as an aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The court remanded the matter for a new hearing.
In an appeal from the denial of the appellant's Penal Code section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage, the Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court improperly made factual findings after looking at the appellant’s testimony at his co-defendant’s trial, which was beyond the record of the appellant's conviction. The court reversed the denial of the appellant’s petition and remanded the matter with instructions to issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the appellant’s murder conviction, recall his sentence, and resentence…
In an appeal from the denial of the appellant's Penal Code section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage, the Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court improperly made factual findings after looking at the appellant’s testimony at his co-defendant’s trial, which was beyond the record of the appellant's conviction. The court reversed the denial of the appellant’s petition and remanded the matter with instructions to issue an order to show cause and hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the appellant’s murder conviction, recall his sentence, and resentence him.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which amended Penal Code section 186.22 by adding a new element, applied retroactively to the appellant’s case. Error was not harmless under the standard articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18. The court concluded that the gang-related enhancement findings must be vacated and the matter remanded to give the People the opportunity to prove the applicability of the enhancements under the amendments to section…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which amended Penal Code section 186.22 by adding a new element, applied retroactively to the appellant’s case. Error was not harmless under the standard articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18. The court concluded that the gang-related enhancement findings must be vacated and the matter remanded to give the People the opportunity to prove the applicability of the enhancements under the amendments to section 186.22.
The court agreed with the parties that the appellant was entitled to a remand for resentencing due to the retroactive application of multiple changes in the law: Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which establishes a presumption that the trial court will impose the lower term when a defendant was under 26 years of age at the time of the offense and their age was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense; Assembly Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which generally limits the trial court’s ability to impose the upper term; Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg.…
The court agreed with the parties that the appellant was entitled to a remand for resentencing due to the retroactive application of multiple changes in the law: Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which establishes a presumption that the trial court will impose the lower term when a defendant was under 26 years of age at the time of the offense and their age was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense; Assembly Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which generally limits the trial court’s ability to impose the upper term; Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which provides that a trial court is no longer required to impose a sentence under the crime providing for the longest possible sentence and may now sentence a defendant under any one of the applicable crimes; and People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, which held that if a trial court strikes or dismisses a Penal Code section 12022.53(d) enhancement, it may then impose an enhancement under section 12022.53(b) or (c). Further, Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) significantly modified the requirements to prove gang enhancement under section 186.22, and because the jury convicted the appellant under the prior version of the law, his gang enhancements must be reversed.
In this appeal from the denial of a Penal Code section 1172.6 resentencing petition, the Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that remand was appropriate in light of Senate Bill No. 775, which extended 1172.6 eligibility to individuals, like appellant, who were convicted of…
In this appeal from the denial of a Penal Code section 1172.6 resentencing petition, the Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that remand was appropriate in light of Senate Bill No. 775, which extended 1172.6 eligibility to individuals, like appellant, who were convicted of manslaughter.
In 2019, appellant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 (now 1172.6), which was summarily denied because the statute did not provide relief for those convicted of voluntary manslaughter. On appeal, appellant argued Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which amended section 1172.6 to expressly permit resentencing of certain individuals convicted of manslaughter, applied, requiring reversal. The Court of Appeal agreed, reversed the denial of appellant’s 1172.6 petition, and remanded for further…
In 2019, appellant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95 (now 1172.6), which was summarily denied because the statute did not provide relief for those convicted of voluntary manslaughter. On appeal, appellant argued Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which amended section 1172.6 to expressly permit resentencing of certain individuals convicted of manslaughter, applied, requiring reversal. The Court of Appeal agreed, reversed the denial of appellant’s 1172.6 petition, and remanded for further proceedings.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that Assembly Bill No. 1869 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) retroactively applied to the appellant. Accordingly, any portion of the fees imposed under Penal Code repealed section 1203.1b that remained unpaid as of July 1, 2021, must be vacated. Furthermore, the probation condition giving the appellant's probation officer the unlimited ability to search all his electronic devices was unconstitutionally overbroad and a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, as the condition had no relationship to his criminal conduct. The court struck the condition and remanded so as to permit…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that Assembly Bill No. 1869 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) retroactively applied to the appellant. Accordingly, any portion of the fees imposed under Penal Code repealed section 1203.1b that remained unpaid as of July 1, 2021, must be vacated. Furthermore, the probation condition giving the appellant's probation officer the unlimited ability to search all his electronic devices was unconstitutionally overbroad and a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, as the condition had no relationship to his criminal conduct. The court struck the condition and remanded so as to permit the trial court to tailor it more narrowly.
The Court of Appeal held that Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) constitutes a clarification of existing law and therefore applies to cases involving the interpretation of former section 1170(d)(1) (now 1170.03). Because the trial court failed to provide the appellant with notice of CDCR's recommendation for resentencing, appoint counsel, hold a hearing, or state its reasons for declining to resentence the appellant, the court reversed and remand the matter so that the trial court can consider CDCR’s recommendation under the new and clarified procedure and guidelines of Penal Code…
The Court of Appeal held that Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) constitutes a clarification of existing law and therefore applies to cases involving the interpretation of former section 1170(d)(1) (now 1170.03). Because the trial court failed to provide the appellant with notice of CDCR's recommendation for resentencing, appoint counsel, hold a hearing, or state its reasons for declining to resentence the appellant, the court reversed and remand the matter so that the trial court can consider CDCR’s recommendation under the new and clarified procedure and guidelines of Penal Code 1170.03.
In a motion to dismiss the People’s appeal, the appellant argued the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant the District Attorney’s motion to reinstate the appellant’s probation over five months after it was terminated pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), making the trial court’s denial of the motion a non-appealable order. The court granted the appellant’s motion to dismiss the People’s…
In a motion to dismiss the People’s appeal, the appellant argued the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant the District Attorney’s motion to reinstate the appellant’s probation over five months after it was terminated pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 1950 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), making the trial court’s denial of the motion a non-appealable order. The court granted the appellant’s motion to dismiss the People’s appeal.
