The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court erred in finding appellant's admission to a Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (b) enhancement made him ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. The order was reversed and the matter was remanded for the trial court to issue an order to show cause and conduct further proceedings consistent with section…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court erred in finding appellant's admission to a Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (b) enhancement made him ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. The order was reversed and the matter was remanded for the trial court to issue an order to show cause and conduct further proceedings consistent with section 1172.6.
In an appeal from a probation revocation hearing where the juvenile court “automatically” imposed a 540-day commitment upon the minor, the Court of Appeal agreed with the minor that the juvenile court erred by failing to review the minor’s circumstances to determine if they would benefit from the commitment. The matter was remanded to the juvenile court for a new hearing consistent with the requirement of the court to conduct a new reassessment each time a minor appears for a dispositional…
In an appeal from a probation revocation hearing where the juvenile court “automatically” imposed a 540-day commitment upon the minor, the Court of Appeal agreed with the minor that the juvenile court erred by failing to review the minor’s circumstances to determine if they would benefit from the commitment. The matter was remanded to the juvenile court for a new hearing consistent with the requirement of the court to conduct a new reassessment each time a minor appears for a dispositional hearing.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that (1) appellant's conviction for involuntary manslaughter must be vacated because it is a necessarily lesser included offense of murder of the same victim, and (2) the murder and felony child abuse convictions as to the same victim were based on the same criminal act, and therefore one of the sentences must be stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. The matter was remanded for…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that (1) appellant's conviction for involuntary manslaughter must be vacated because it is a necessarily lesser included offense of murder of the same victim, and (2) the murder and felony child abuse convictions as to the same victim were based on the same criminal act, and therefore one of the sentences must be stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. The matter was remanded for resentencing.
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that the trial court erred in imposing a greater parole revocation fine at his Penal Code section 1172.75 resentencing hearing than his original restitution fine. The court also found that the issue was not forfeited due to a lack of objection because an unauthorized sentence was imposed which is an issue which may be raised at any time. The matter was remanded for the imposition of a parole revocation fine which complies with Penal Code section 1202.45, and to vacate the portion of the judgment imposing the restitution fine under section…
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that the trial court erred in imposing a greater parole revocation fine at his Penal Code section 1172.75 resentencing hearing than his original restitution fine. The court also found that the issue was not forfeited due to a lack of objection because an unauthorized sentence was imposed which is an issue which may be raised at any time. The matter was remanded for the imposition of a parole revocation fine which complies with Penal Code section 1202.45, and to vacate the portion of the judgment imposing the restitution fine under section 1202.4.
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that when the trial court recalled appellant's sentence, he was entitled to retroactive application of amendments to Penal Code section 186.22. The sentence was vacated and the matter was remanded for further proceedings to permit the trial court to determine the effect the amendments have on appellant's…
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that when the trial court recalled appellant's sentence, he was entitled to retroactive application of amendments to Penal Code section 186.22. The sentence was vacated and the matter was remanded for further proceedings to permit the trial court to determine the effect the amendments have on appellant's conviction.
In an appeal from a conviction of attempting to dissuade a victim from causing a parole violation to be prosecuted, the Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that (1) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the relevant conduct must have occurred before the initiation of parole violation proceedings, and (2) there was insufficient evidence to prove that the dissuading conduct occurred before the charges were filed. As a result, the Court of Appeal reversed the…
In an appeal from a conviction of attempting to dissuade a victim from causing a parole violation to be prosecuted, the Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that (1) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the relevant conduct must have occurred before the initiation of parole violation proceedings, and (2) there was insufficient evidence to prove that the dissuading conduct occurred before the charges were filed. As a result, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment.
At appellant's Penal Code section 1172.75 resentencing hearing, the trial court stated it had discretion to resentence defendant but declined to exercise it, and then did not pronounce a new sentence or issue an amended abstract of judgment. The Court of Appeal held that because section 1172.75 provides the trial court shall "recall and resentence defendant," the failure to resentence appellant requires reversal and remand for consideration of his motion to strike his prior strike conviction. (People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th…
At appellant's Penal Code section 1172.75 resentencing hearing, the trial court stated it had discretion to resentence defendant but declined to exercise it, and then did not pronounce a new sentence or issue an amended abstract of judgment. The Court of Appeal held that because section 1172.75 provides the trial court shall "recall and resentence defendant," the failure to resentence appellant requires reversal and remand for consideration of his motion to strike his prior strike conviction. (People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838.)
In an appeal from an order resentencing appellant under Penal Code section 1172.75, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the matter must be remanded for the trial court to consider whether he is eligible for relief under the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act. The Court reversed the trial court's resentencing order and remanded for a new resentencing…
In an appeal from an order resentencing appellant under Penal Code section 1172.75, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the matter must be remanded for the trial court to consider whether he is eligible for relief under the revised penalty provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act. The Court reversed the trial court's resentencing order and remanded for a new resentencing hearing.
In an appeal from the denial of a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that insufficient evidence supported the trial court's finding that he acted with reckless indifference to human life. The Court of Appeal reversed the order denying the petition, and remanded with directions to grant the petition, vacate appellant's murder conviction, and resentence…
In an appeal from the denial of a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that insufficient evidence supported the trial court's finding that he acted with reckless indifference to human life. The Court of Appeal reversed the order denying the petition, and remanded with directions to grant the petition, vacate appellant's murder conviction, and resentence him.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering interest on victim restitution to accrue from the date of the offense. Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(G) provides that a restitution order “shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant’s criminal conduct, including . . . [i]nterest, at the rate of 10 percent per annum, that accrues as of the date of sentencing or loss, as determined by the court.” Here, there…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering interest on victim restitution to accrue from the date of the offense. Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(G) provides that a restitution order “shall be of a dollar amount that is sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant’s criminal conduct, including . . . [i]nterest, at the rate of 10 percent per annum, that accrues as of the date of sentencing or loss, as determined by the court.” Here, there was no evidence that the victim had incurred losses until months after the offense. The portion of the restitution order regarding interest was reversed and the matter was and remanded for the trial court to select an appropriate date from which interest will accrue.
In an appeal from the juvenile court's orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the juvenile court and the Health and Human Services Department failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Appellant argued that despite some inquiry efforts by the Department, there was no record of ICWA inquiries directed to many known maternal relatives, including several of the mother's twelve siblings. The Court of Appeal agreed and conditionally reversed, remanding for compliance with…
In an appeal from the juvenile court's orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the juvenile court and the Health and Human Services Department failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Appellant argued that despite some inquiry efforts by the Department, there was no record of ICWA inquiries directed to many known maternal relatives, including several of the mother's twelve siblings. The Court of Appeal agreed and conditionally reversed, remanding for compliance with ICWA.
Before jury selection, defense counsel indicated that appellant wanted to pursue mental health diversion, which he had sought previously before abandoning his efforts. The trial court denied the motion as untimely. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court erred in making this determination. In a jury trial, “to be timely, a request for diversion must be made before attachment of jeopardy . . . .” (People v. Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791, 819.) “In a trial by jury, the defendant is deemed to have been placed in jeopardy when the jurors have been impaneled and…
Before jury selection, defense counsel indicated that appellant wanted to pursue mental health diversion, which he had sought previously before abandoning his efforts. The trial court denied the motion as untimely. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court erred in making this determination. In a jury trial, “to be timely, a request for diversion must be made before attachment of jeopardy . . . .” (People v. Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791, 819.) “In a trial by jury, the defendant is deemed to have been placed in jeopardy when the jurors have been impaneled and sworn.” (People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 299.) The matter was conditionally reversed and remanded for the trial court to consider appellant's application for mental health diversion.
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the superior court's order denying his Penal Code section 1172.6 petition must be reversed because the court failed to consider the effect of appellant's youth on its reckless indifference finding. Following transfer from the California Supreme Court with directions to reconsider in light of People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, the court held that appellant was entitled to a new evidentiary hearing at which the superior court could meaningfully consider his youth as part of the totality of circumstances bearing on whether he acted with reckless indifference to human life.…
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the superior court's order denying his Penal Code section 1172.6 petition must be reversed because the court failed to consider the effect of appellant's youth on its reckless indifference finding. Following transfer from the California Supreme Court with directions to reconsider in light of People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, the court held that appellant was entitled to a new evidentiary hearing at which the superior court could meaningfully consider his youth as part of the totality of circumstances bearing on whether he acted with reckless indifference to human life. The court further agreed with appellant that substantial evidence did not support the superior court's alternative finding that he aided and abetted the murder with intent to kill. The order denying the petition was reversed and the matter remanded for a new evidentiary hearing.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Family Services failed to comply with ICWA's inquiry and notice…
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Family Services failed to comply with ICWA's inquiry and notice requirements.
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the trial court erred by limiting resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 to only one of the several cases consolidated into his aggregate sentence. The court held that appellant was entitled to a full resentencing on the entirety of his aggregate sentence, not just the narrow portion containing the invalid prior prison term enhancement. The Court of Appeal reversed the resentencing order and remanded for a full resentencing on all cases comprising the aggregate…
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the trial court erred by limiting resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 to only one of the several cases consolidated into his aggregate sentence. The court held that appellant was entitled to a full resentencing on the entirety of his aggregate sentence, not just the narrow portion containing the invalid prior prison term enhancement. The Court of Appeal reversed the resentencing order and remanded for a full resentencing on all cases comprising the aggregate sentence.
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant (A.D.) that the juvenile court abused its discretion by summarily denying the Stanislaus County Community Services Agency's Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition to reopen dependency, and set a section 366.26 hearing so the guardian (A.D.) could pursue adopting C.M. The matter was remanded to the juvenile court with directions to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the agency's…
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant (A.D.) that the juvenile court abused its discretion by summarily denying the Stanislaus County Community Services Agency's Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition to reopen dependency, and set a section 366.26 hearing so the guardian (A.D.) could pursue adopting C.M. The matter was remanded to the juvenile court with directions to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the agency's petition.
At appellant's Penal Code section 1172.75 resentencing hearing, the trial court declined to strike his prior strike offenses, one of which had been redesignated as a non-strike offense by the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. In light of People v. Superior Court (Guevara) 18 Cal.5th 838, the Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing. The trial court's determination that appellant would be a public safety risk if his sentence was reduced was improperly based on the standard articulated in section 1385, subdivision (c), as opposed to section 1170.126. Under section 1385, subdivision, (c), the court has discretion to dismiss an…
At appellant's Penal Code section 1172.75 resentencing hearing, the trial court declined to strike his prior strike offenses, one of which had been redesignated as a non-strike offense by the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. In light of People v. Superior Court (Guevara) 18 Cal.5th 838, the Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing. The trial court's determination that appellant would be a public safety risk if his sentence was reduced was improperly based on the standard articulated in section 1385, subdivision (c), as opposed to section 1170.126. Under section 1385, subdivision, (c), the court has discretion to dismiss an enhancement unless there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2); see People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029.) This likelihood standard is not equivalent to or inclusive of the “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” standard described in section 1170.126. Thus, the record did not clearly indicate the trial court would have imposed the same sentence even if it had been aware of the scope of its discretion. The Court of Appeal remanded the matter for resentencing.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that appellant's conviction for making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422) must be reversed because the charge is barred by the statute of limitations. The applicable statute of limitations is three years. (§§ 17, 422, 801; People v. Meza (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 821, 825.) In both the complaint and information, appellant was charged with making a criminal threat between March 31, 1999, and March 30, 2004. However, the prosecution commenced, at the earliest, on December 2, 2022 when the arrest warrant was issued. (§ 804.) There were no facts alleged in…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that appellant's conviction for making a criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422) must be reversed because the charge is barred by the statute of limitations. The applicable statute of limitations is three years. (§§ 17, 422, 801; People v. Meza (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 821, 825.) In both the complaint and information, appellant was charged with making a criminal threat between March 31, 1999, and March 30, 2004. However, the prosecution commenced, at the earliest, on December 2, 2022 when the arrest warrant was issued. (§ 804.) There were no facts alleged in the accusatory pleading showing that the prosecution is not barred by the statute of limitations. (People v. Sedillo (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1048.) The court reversed the conviction, vacated the sentence, and remanded the matter for full resentencing.
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that Penal Code section 654 prohibited multiple punishment for his convictions for second degree murder and active participation in a criminal street gang, because both convictions were based on the same felonious conduct. At resentencing, the trial court had imposed a concurrent sentence on the gang conviction rather than staying execution of sentence on one of the counts. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, directing the trial court to exercise its discretion under amended section 654 to determine which sentence to…
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that Penal Code section 654 prohibited multiple punishment for his convictions for second degree murder and active participation in a criminal street gang, because both convictions were based on the same felonious conduct. At resentencing, the trial court had imposed a concurrent sentence on the gang conviction rather than staying execution of sentence on one of the counts. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, directing the trial court to exercise its discretion under amended section 654 to determine which sentence to stay.
Appellant was convicted of second degree murder and active participation in a criminal street gang. At resentencing, the trial court imposed an upper term of three years on the gang conviction to run concurrently with the 15-years-to-life murder sentence. The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that both convictions were based on the same felonious conduct, and that Penal Code section 654 therefore prohibited multiple punishment. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, directing the trial court to exercise its discretion under section 654 to determine which sentence to…
Appellant was convicted of second degree murder and active participation in a criminal street gang. At resentencing, the trial court imposed an upper term of three years on the gang conviction to run concurrently with the 15-years-to-life murder sentence. The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that both convictions were based on the same felonious conduct, and that Penal Code section 654 therefore prohibited multiple punishment. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, directing the trial court to exercise its discretion under section 654 to determine which sentence to stay.
In a Penal Code section 1172.6 proceeding, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that substantial evidence did not support the trial court's finding that he acted with reckless indifference to human life during a robbery in which a codefendant shot and killed the victim. The court found that appellant planned a "garden-variety armed robbery," did not know those he was with would use lethal force, took steps to minimize the risk of violence, and had no meaningful opportunity to restrain the shooter during the brief and unexpected deadly encounter. The Court of Appeal reversed the order denying the…
In a Penal Code section 1172.6 proceeding, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that substantial evidence did not support the trial court's finding that he acted with reckless indifference to human life during a robbery in which a codefendant shot and killed the victim. The court found that appellant planned a "garden-variety armed robbery," did not know those he was with would use lethal force, took steps to minimize the risk of violence, and had no meaningful opportunity to restrain the shooter during the brief and unexpected deadly encounter. The Court of Appeal reversed the order denying the petition and remanded with directions to vacate the voluntary manslaughter conviction and the attached firearm use enhancement and to resentence appellant on the remaining charges.
In an appeal of the trial court’s order denying a Penal Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing, the Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s finding that the appellant acted with reckless indifference to human life. The order denying the appellant’s section 1172.6 petition was reversed and the matter was remanded to the trial court with instructions to vacate the appellant's voluntary manslaughter conviction and the attached firearm use enhancement and to resentence appellant on the remaining…
In an appeal of the trial court’s order denying a Penal Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing, the Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s finding that the appellant acted with reckless indifference to human life. The order denying the appellant’s section 1172.6 petition was reversed and the matter was remanded to the trial court with instructions to vacate the appellant's voluntary manslaughter conviction and the attached firearm use enhancement and to resentence appellant on the remaining charges.
In a juvenile delinquency matter, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his petition to terminate his sex offender registration requirement. The court held that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving that community safety would be significantly enhanced by appellant's continued…
In a juvenile delinquency matter, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his petition to terminate his sex offender registration requirement. The court held that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving that community safety would be significantly enhanced by appellant's continued registration.
Appellant was convicted by jury in 2013 of, among other offenses, active participation in a criminal street gang with true findings on a gang enhancement and a gang-related prior serious felony and strike conviction. He was resentenced pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75 in 2024; the resentencing court struck appellant's prison prior enhancement, but otherwise left the sentence intact. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021−2022 Reg. Sess.) applies retroactively to the substantive gang offense conviction and all the gang-related allegations. The court vacated the resentencing order, reversed the substantive gang offense conviction,…
Appellant was convicted by jury in 2013 of, among other offenses, active participation in a criminal street gang with true findings on a gang enhancement and a gang-related prior serious felony and strike conviction. He was resentenced pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75 in 2024; the resentencing court struck appellant's prison prior enhancement, but otherwise left the sentence intact. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021−2022 Reg. Sess.) applies retroactively to the substantive gang offense conviction and all the gang-related allegations. The court vacated the resentencing order, reversed the substantive gang offense conviction, and vacated the findings on the gang enhancement, prior serious felony, and strike prior. On remand, the prosecution may retry all the gang-related allegations under the new law.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that the trial court erred in overruling appellant's objection to the prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge against one of only two African-American prospective jurors, in violation of Penal Code section 231.7. The judgment of conviction was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that the trial court erred in overruling appellant's objection to the prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge against one of only two African-American prospective jurors, in violation of Penal Code section 231.7. The judgment of conviction was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial.
At appellant's Penal Code section 1172.75 resentencing hearing, the trial court declined to apply relevant provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. In light of People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, the Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing, as the trial court did not apply the precise test articulated in Guevara, with the requisite presumption of resentencing under the Reform Act and requirement that any risk be…
At appellant's Penal Code section 1172.75 resentencing hearing, the trial court declined to apply relevant provisions of the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. In light of People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, the Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing, as the trial court did not apply the precise test articulated in Guevara, with the requisite presumption of resentencing under the Reform Act and requirement that any risk be unreasonable.
Appellant was convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances and first degree burglary, for which the trial court imposed a sentence of LWOP plus 20 years. The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that the $10,000 parole revocation restitution fine and equivalent parole revocation fine must be stricken because his sentence included a term of LWOP. The court also corrected a clerical error on the abstract of judgment regarding the calculation of appellant’s aggregate…
Appellant was convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances and first degree burglary, for which the trial court imposed a sentence of LWOP plus 20 years. The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that the $10,000 parole revocation restitution fine and equivalent parole revocation fine must be stricken because his sentence included a term of LWOP. The court also corrected a clerical error on the abstract of judgment regarding the calculation of appellant’s aggregate sentence.
A jury convicted appellant of two counts of murder, each with a multiple-murder circumstance. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that two murders support only one multiple-murder special circumstance. (People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 425.) The court ordered one of the findings to be…
A jury convicted appellant of two counts of murder, each with a multiple-murder circumstance. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that two murders support only one multiple-murder special circumstance. (People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 425.) The court ordered one of the findings to be stricken.
After a jury convicted appellant, the trial court found true that his convictions were numerous and/or of increasing seriousness (California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)), and that he served a prior prison term (rule 4.421(b)(3)). Accordingly, the court imposed the upper term. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court erred when it imposed the upper term based on aggravating facts that did not conform with the jury trial requirements under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b). The error was not harmless. The matter was remanded for…
After a jury convicted appellant, the trial court found true that his convictions were numerous and/or of increasing seriousness (California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)), and that he served a prior prison term (rule 4.421(b)(3)). Accordingly, the court imposed the upper term. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court erred when it imposed the upper term based on aggravating facts that did not conform with the jury trial requirements under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b). The error was not harmless. The matter was remanded for resentencing.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Health and Human Services Agency failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice…
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Health and Human Services Agency failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice requirements.