The Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing in light of legislative changes to Penal Code section 518 made by Senate Bill No. 654 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which now affords trial courts the discretion to choose the count on which to impose punishment, instead of having to choose the one that provided for the longest potential term of imprisonment. On remand, appellant shall receive a full resentencing.
In an appeal from a reunification order issued pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5(c)(2), the Court of Appeal found there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that family reunification services were in the children’s best interests.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Family Services failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice requirements.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Family Services failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice requirements.
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that his former Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b) gang enhancements and section 12022.53, subdivision (e) gang-related firearm enhancements should be reversed and remand for full resentencing under Assembly Bill No. 333. On remand, appellant will receive a full resentencing where he can raise the application of Senate Bill No. 567.
The Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing in light of legislative changes to Penal Code section 518 made by Senate Bill No. 654 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which now affords trial courts the discretion to choose the count on which to impose punishment, instead of having to choose the one that provided for the longest potential term of imprisonment. The Court of Appeal also remanded for resentencing in light of legislative changes to Penal Code section 1170 made by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which now requires that circumstances in aggravation used to justify imposition of the upper term be found true by the jury, admitted by the defendant, or based on prior convictions evidenced by a certified record of conviction.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the order denying appellant’s application for mental health diversion must be reversed in light of amendments to Penal Code section 1001.36 by Senate Bill No. 1223 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). First, the trial court could not properly rely on the nature of appellant’s offenses because they do not per se disqualify him from diversion under section 1001.36, subdivision (d). Second, there was no evidence appellant was likely to commit a super-strike offense and thus no evidence he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Finally, the court’s finding that appellant’s offenses are not mental health related was an abuse of discretion in light of amended section 1001.36, which now includes a presumption that appellant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the offense. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence the appellant’s mental disorder was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to his involvement in the alleged offense. The Court of Appeal remanded the matter for the trial court to reevaluate appellant’s application under amended section 1001.36.
The Court of Appeal found that the juvenile court’s factual findings underlying its removal order were unsupported by the evidence, and therefore, it erred by ordering E.P. removed from father’s custody. The court reversed the portion of the juvenile court’s order removing E.P. from father’s custody under section Welfare and Institutions Code section 361 and remanded for further proceedings for father to request custody under section 361.2.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Family Services failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice requirements.
After the trial court summarily denied appellant’s Penal Code section 1172.6 petition, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that appellant pleaded a prima facie case for relief and his convictions (first degree murder with willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation) did not render him ineligible for relief as a matter of law. The jury was instructed on two theories of attempted murder—express malice attempted murder and natural and probable consequences attempted murder as an aider and abettor. Based on the instructions given, the jury could have found defendant guilty of first degree premeditated attempted murder under either an indirect aiding and abetting natural and probable consequences doctrine theory or an express malice theory. The indirect aiding and abetting natural and probable consequences doctrine theory is no longer valid under Senate Bill 1437 and, based on the record before the trial court, the court was not permitted to make the factual finding necessary to rule out that theory at the prima facie stage.
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, the Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the Stanislaus County Community Services Agency and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law because maternal and paternal extended family members were not asked about the child’s possible Indian ancestry. The error was not harmless. The court accepted a joint stipulation seeking a limited remand to the court for purposes of ICWA compliance.
Because the record was completely silent as to whether the trial court made true findings that the appellant had previously been convicted of strikes under Penal Code sections 667, subdivision (e)(2), and 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2), the Court of Appeal held the appellant’s strike sentence was unauthorized. The sentence was vacated without prejudice as to the trial court’s ability to correct the record if it could be clearly shown that the omission of strike findings was a clerical error and not a failure to make a finding and disposition on those allegations.
Additionally, the court held Assembly Bill No. 518, which modified section 654 to give trial courts the discretion to choose the count on which to impose punishment (instead of having to choose the one that provided for the longest potential term of imprisonment), applies retroactively to the appellant’s case. Because the court was already remanding the case, it instructed the trial court to exercise its discretion under the current version of section 654.
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant’s argument that one of her two convictions for accessory after the fact must be reversed because both counts were based upon the single act of concealing a firearm; and the jury’s true findings on the criminal street gang enhancements must be vacated pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which was enacted during the pendency of this appeal.
The Court of Appeal found the trial court prejudicially erred when it concluded the People’s peremptory challenge was valid because the prosecutor provided no evidence to rebut the presumptively invalid reasons for exercising the challenge (the juror’s “negative experience with law enforcement” and her “close relationship with people who have been convicted of a crime.”) The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
The Court of Appeal held that the trial court prejudicially erred when it concluded the People’s peremptory challenge was valid because the prosecutor provided no evidence to rebut the presumptively invalid reasons for exercising the challenge. The reason was presumptively invalid under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, which was added by Assembly Bill No. 3070 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), a bill that creates new procedures for identifying unlawful discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. The court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Family Services failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice requirements.
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the Kern County Department of Human Services and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law because extended family members were not asked about the child’s Indian ancestry. The court conditionally reversed the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply and remanded for full compliance with ICWA.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Family Services failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice requirements.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court relied on improper aggravating factors in imposing the upper term. The trial court (1) relied on the same factor to impose both the upper term and a consecutive sentence, (2) considered a fact that was an element of the offense when choosing the upper term, and (3) relied on the appellant’s prior felony convictions, as opposed to his current convictions, in finding that he was sentenced to concurrent terms when he could have been sentenced to consecutive terms. The errors were not harmless. The sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.
The Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing in light of legislative changes to Penal Code section 1170 made by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which now requires that circumstances in aggravation used to justify imposition of the upper term be found true by the jury, admitted by the defendant, or based on prior convictions evidenced by a certified record of conviction.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Family Services failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice requirements. The court also found that the juvenile court’s order for random drug testing and requirement that father test negative for all substances was an abuse of discretion, as there was no basis on which to conclude father abused substances. The court reversed that portion of the juvenile court’s disposition.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Family Services failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice requirements.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that Assembly Bill No. 518, which modified Penal Code section 654 to give trial courts the discretion to choose the count on which to impose punishment (instead of having to choose the one that provided for the longest potential term of imprisonment), applies retroactively to the appellant’s case. The court ordered the matter remanded for resentencing and stated the appellant may then raise his arguments regarding Senate Bill No. 567, which amended section 1170 to require the trial court to impose the lower term if the defendant was under 26 years of age on the date the offense was committed, “unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances [so] that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(B); see § 1016.7, subd. (b).)
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that the case must be remanded for resentencing in light of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which generally limits the trial court’s ability to impose an upper term sentence unless aggravating circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury or by the court in a court trial.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Human Services failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice requirements.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Human Services failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice requirements.
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, the Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the Fresno County Department of Social Services and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California law because extended family members were not asked about the child’s Indian ancestry and the juvenile court failed to conduct its own inquiry with the parents. The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply was conditionally reversed and the matter was remanded for compliance with the ICWA.
The Court of Appeal held that the juvenile court erred in failing to stay one of minor’s offenses pursuant to Penal Code section 654 when calculating his maximum period of confinement. The juvenile court additionally erred in failing to consider minor’s suitability for deferred entry of judgment (“DEJ”). The notice minor was given of his eligibility was inadequate because it did not identify a date for a DEJ suitability hearing and nothing in the record suggests that the inadequate notice was actually served on minor’s custodial adult at least 24 hours prior to the time set for the DEJ suitability hearing. Accordingly, minor was not properly advised of his eligibility and his decision to contest the allegations cannot be fairly understood as a rejection of DEJ.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Human Services failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry requirements.
The Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing in light of legislative changes to Penal Code section 1170 made by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which now requires that circumstances in aggravation used to justify imposition of the upper term be found true by the jury, admitted by the defendant, or based on prior convictions evidenced by a certified record of conviction.
