The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the abstract of judgment should be amended to reflect the jury’s intent to convict the appellant of violating Penal Code section 136.1, subdivision (a), rather than subdivision (b)(1). Although the appellant was charged and convicted under subdivision (b)(1), the information and jury instructions clearly establish the prosecution’s intent to to charge and convict him under subdivision (a). Additionally, the evidence supports convictions under subdivision (a) rather than subdivision (b)(1). Because the prosecution’s intent is clear, the error in the form of the verdict is immaterial. (People v. Jones (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 693, 710–711; People v. Paul (1998) 18 Cal.4th 698, 707.). The court further held that the protective order issued by the trial court must be stricken because it was not authorized under section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1), as the appellant was not convicted of any of the offenses encompassed by section.
In 2022, the district attorney successfully moved the juvenile court to transfer appellant to the superior court to be tried as an adult for various crimes. The juvenile court granted the transfer based on a preponderance of the evidence standard. The Court of Appeal found the juvenile court’s order must be reversed based on Assembly Bill No. 2361. AB 2361, which became effective January 1, 2023, retroactively requires the transfer of a minor from juvenile court to a criminal court to be based on “clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court,” rather than the former preponderance of the evidence standard. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(3).) Consequently, the court reversed the juvenile court’s order and remanded for a new fitness hearing.
The Court of Appeal held that the in appellant’s trial, the felony murder and special circumstance jury instructions improperly permitted the jury to find defendant liable under a proximate cause theory rather than as the actual killer, a requirement after the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437. Additionally, the court found that the admission of appellant’s prior robbery charge, which was admitted to show a common plan, was relevant only for identity, and the prior robbery was not sufficiently similar to the robbery at issue in this case for identity purposes. Accordingly, the court reversed appellant’s conviction for first degree murder and the special circumstance finding.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Family Services failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice requirements.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Human Services failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice requirements.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders, the Court of Appeal agreed with appellant, the mother of L.C., that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over L.C., under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. The case was reversed and remanded with directions to the juvenile court to comply with the provisions of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. The court also directed the juvenile court to vacate its Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) finding and enter new findings as to L.C., after further ICWA compliance proceedings.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the appellant’s case must be remanded for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b), which generally limits the trial court’s ability to impose an upper term sentence unless aggravating circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury or by the court in a court trial. Although the trial court “may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3)),” the probation report, which was the only document in the record containing the appellant’s criminal history, was not a certified record of conviction.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for entry of a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Penal Code section 1118.1. The offense of failure to update annual registration as a sex offender (Pen. Code, § 290.012, subd. (a)) required the People to prove that appellant resided in California during the relevant time period. They did not prove this element of the offense, requiring acquittal.
In an appeal from the termination of parental rights, the court found that the Department of Human Services and the juvenile court did not satisfy their duty to inquire into the extended family’s possible Native American ancestry. The error was not harmless. The juvenile court’s finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) does not apply was conditionally reversed and the case was remanded for compliance with ICWA.
In an appeal from the termination of parental rights, the court found that the Department of Social Services and the juvenile court did not satisfy their duty to inquire into the extended family’s possible Native American ancestry. The error was not harmless. The juvenile court’s finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) does not apply was conditionally reversed and the case was remanded for compliance with ICWA.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that Assembly Bill No. 518 (which modified Penal Code section 654 to give trial courts the discretion to choose the count on which to impose punishment instead of having to choose the one that provided for the longest potential term of imprisonment) and Senate Bill No. 567 (which generally limits the trial court’s ability to impose an upper term sentence unless aggravating circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury or by the court in a court trial) apply retroactively to the appellant’s case. The matter was remanded for resentencing.
In an appeal from orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the department failed to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) because the department did not contact extended family members to inquire about the ICWA. The court conditionally affirmed the orders, subject only to compliance with the ICWA.
In an appeal from the termination of parental rights, the court found that the Department of Family Services did not satisfy their duty to inquire into all relatives’ possible Native American ancestry. The error was not harmless. The matter was conditionally reversed and the case was remanded for compliance with ICWA.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that Assembly Bill No. 333 applies retroactively to the appellant’s substantive gang offense and gang enhancements under Penal Code section 186.22. As a result, the court reversed the gang offense and enhancements and remanded the matter to allow the prosecution the opportunity to elect whether to retry the appellant under current law. The appellant is furthermore entitled to a full resentencing hearing under section 1170, which was amended by Assembly Bill No. 124 to include a presumption in favor of the lower term sentence when a defendant is under 26 years of age at the time of the offense.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the appellant’s gang enhancement and convictions must be reversed in light of Assembly Bill No. 333. Additionally, the appellant is entitled to resentencing pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 124, which amended Penal Code section 1170 to include a presumption in favor of the lower term sentence when a defendant is under 26 years of age at the time of the offense. Upon remand, the People have the opportunity to retry the gang enhancement and convictions in conformance with the current law.
The Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing in light of legislative changes to Penal Code section 1170 made by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which, among other things, created a presumption in favor of a low prison term upon a showing that the defendant’s psychological trauma was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense.
In an appeal from an order transferring the minor from the juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that changes to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 made by Assembly Bill No. 2361 applied retroactively to the minor’s case. Assembly Bill No. 2361 amended section 707 to require that before issuing a transfer order, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under its jurisdiction. Here, there was a reasonable probability the juvenile court would not have transferred the minor had it applied the current law. The Court of Appeal reversed the transfer order and remanded for an amenability hearing pursuant to amended section 707.
The Court of Appeal reversed the appellant’s murder conviction, agreeing with the parties that the optional paragraph in CALCRIM No. 571 (“[i]mperfect self-defense does not apply when the defendant, through his own wrongful conduct, has created circumstances that justify his adversary’s use of force”) was erroneously given to the jury. The factual circumstances of the case did not support the paragraph because the victim’s use of force was not legally justified. The error was not harmless under either Watson or Chapman. Given that none of the appellant’s remaining contentions would preclude retrial of the murder conviction, the court found them moot and declined to consider them.
In an appeal from the termination of parental rights, the court found that the Department of Social Services and the juvenile court did not satisfy their duty to inquire into the extended family’s possible Native American ancestry. The error was not harmless. The juvenile court’s finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) does not apply was conditionally reversed and the case was remanded for compliance with ICWA.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that Assembly Bill No. 518, which modified Penal Code section 654 to give trial courts the discretion to choose the count on which to impose punishment (instead of having to choose the one that provided for the longest potential term of imprisonment), applies retroactively to the appellant’s case. Nothing in the record clearly indicated that the trial court would have chosen to punish the appellant under the provision with the longest term had it had discretion to do otherwise at the time of sentencing. The court ordered the matter remanded for resentencing.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the case must be remanded for resentencing in light of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). Appellant will be able to raise any other sentencing contentions at the full resentencing hearing on remand.
In light of People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s Penal Code section 1172.6 petition for resentencing, holding that a pre-Banks and Clark special circumstance finding did not preclude the appellant from making a prima facie case for relief.
In an appeal from the termination of the appellant’s parental rights, the parties agreed that the juvenile court and the Fresno County Department of Social Services failed to comply with the initial inquiry provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act and related California law. The record indicated that the department failed to ask the children’s father and extended family members about the children’s potential status as Indian children. The Court of Appeal conditionally reversed the juvenile court’s findings that ICWA does not apply and remanded for proceedings to ensure ICWA compliance.
The Court of Appeal found the trial court failed to comply with Penal Code section 1172.6 when it denied both of appellant’s section 1172.6 petitions without granting his request for appointment of counsel, inviting further briefing, or conducting a hearing as to whether he stated a prima facie case for relief and an order to show cause should be issued. The Court of Appeal also found the trial court engaged in impermissible fact finding at the prima facie stage. The trial court’s summary denial was reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
The Court of Appeal reversed on the grounds that the trial court did not consider whether to impose a lesser firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.53; appellant’s prior offenses no longer qualify for a prior prison term enhancement under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b); and the abstract of judgment did not accurately reflect appellant’s presentence custody credit.
The Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing in light of legislative changes to Penal Code section 1170 made by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which now requires that circumstances in aggravation used to justify imposition of the upper term be found true by the jury, admitted by the defendant, or based on prior convictions evidenced by a certified record of conviction.
In an appeal from the termination of parental rights, the Court of Appeal accepted the concession of Sacramento Department of Child, Family and Adult Services that they did not make a finding as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 and the Indian Child Welfare Act. The case was reversed and remanded for limited proceedings in compliance with the ICWA.
In an appeal from the termination of parental rights, the court found that the juvenile court did not make a finding, as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 and the Indian Child Welfare Act, that continued custody of the minor would likely result in serious physical or emotional damage to the minor. The order terminating parental rights was reversed and the matter was remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings in compliance with the ICWA.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating the appellants’ parental rights, the agency conceded it conducted an inadequate investigation under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) by failing to interview the child’s extended family members regarding the child’s Indian ancestry. The Court of Appeal accepted a joint stipulation from the parties seeking a conditional reversal and limited remand to the juvenile court for compliance with ICWA and the issuance of an immediate remittitur.
The Court of Appeal remanded for resentencing in light of legislative changes to Penal Code section 1170 made by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which, among other things, created a presumption in favor of a low prison term upon a showing that the defendant’s youth was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense.
