The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court erred in determining victim restitution based on the stolen items’ manufacturer’s suggested retail price rather than the wholesale price. The Court of Appeal did not decide whether appellant properly objected; because the proper measure of restitution presents a pure question of law, the court exercised its discretion to reach the merits. The matter was remanded for a new restitution…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court erred in determining victim restitution based on the stolen items’ manufacturer’s suggested retail price rather than the wholesale price. The Court of Appeal did not decide whether appellant properly objected; because the proper measure of restitution presents a pure question of law, the court exercised its discretion to reach the merits. The matter was remanded for a new restitution hearing.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the juvenile court’s true finding that minor committed robbery for the benefit of a criminal street gang pursuant to Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A) must be reversed, and the matter remanded, because there was insufficient evidence of predicate offenses showing the alleged gang members individually or collectively engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity. (See § 186.22, subds. (e)(1) &…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the juvenile court’s true finding that minor committed robbery for the benefit of a criminal street gang pursuant to Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(A) must be reversed, and the matter remanded, because there was insufficient evidence of predicate offenses showing the alleged gang members individually or collectively engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity. (See § 186.22, subds. (e)(1) & (f).)
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that one of appellant's convictions for possessing a weapon in prison (Pen. Code, § 4502, subd. (a)) should be reversed because section 4502 permits only a single conviction for possession of more than one unlawful weapon at the same time and place in prison. The court reversed one of appellant's counts and remanded the matter for…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that one of appellant's convictions for possessing a weapon in prison (Pen. Code, § 4502, subd. (a)) should be reversed because section 4502 permits only a single conviction for possession of more than one unlawful weapon at the same time and place in prison. The court reversed one of appellant's counts and remanded the matter for resentencing.
In this resentencing appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed that under People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, the trial court failed to award legally mandated custody credits at appellant’s resentencing hearing. (Pen. Code, § 2900.1) The court determined that the trial court’s abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the actual days served in custody up until resentencing. The Court of Appeal remanded the case to the trial court to award and calculate custody credits up to appellant’s resentencing…
In this resentencing appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed that under People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, the trial court failed to award legally mandated custody credits at appellant’s resentencing hearing. (Pen. Code, § 2900.1) The court determined that the trial court’s abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the actual days served in custody up until resentencing. The Court of Appeal remanded the case to the trial court to award and calculate custody credits up to appellant’s resentencing date.
After a jury convicted appellant, the trial court sentenced him pursuant to the “habitual offender” provisions in Penal Code section 667.7 and also imposed a consecutive determinate term for three sentence enhancements. The Court of Appeal held that section 667.7 precludes imposition of enhancements in addition to a habitual offender sentence. The court modified the sentence to strike the…
After a jury convicted appellant, the trial court sentenced him pursuant to the “habitual offender” provisions in Penal Code section 667.7 and also imposed a consecutive determinate term for three sentence enhancements. The Court of Appeal held that section 667.7 precludes imposition of enhancements in addition to a habitual offender sentence. The court modified the sentence to strike the enhancements.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Social Services failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice…
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Social Services failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice requirements.
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on count 2 for attempted voluntary manslaughter and reversed the conviction. Second, the court concluded that the trial court’s use of the pre-Assembly Bill 333 pattern jury instruction was prejudicial. This required reversal of the gang enhancements, the substantive gang offense (count 7), and the related section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1) gang-related firearm use…
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on count 2 for attempted voluntary manslaughter and reversed the conviction. Second, the court concluded that the trial court’s use of the pre-Assembly Bill 333 pattern jury instruction was prejudicial. This required reversal of the gang enhancements, the substantive gang offense (count 7), and the related section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1) gang-related firearm use enhancements.
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that the amendments made to Penal Code section 186.22 by AB 333 should have applied during the section 1172.75 resentencing proceedings, necessitating reversal of his gang conviction and gang…
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that the amendments made to Penal Code section 186.22 by AB 333 should have applied during the section 1172.75 resentencing proceedings, necessitating reversal of his gang conviction and gang enhancements.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that in light of People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, the trial court prejudicially erred by imposing an upper term sentence in the absence of appellant's personal jury trial waiver on the aggravating circumstance that his prior convictions were numerous and of increasing seriousness. The People agreed. The matter was remanded for a full…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that in light of People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, the trial court prejudicially erred by imposing an upper term sentence in the absence of appellant's personal jury trial waiver on the aggravating circumstance that his prior convictions were numerous and of increasing seriousness. The People agreed. The matter was remanded for a full resentencing.
In a published opinion, the Court of Appeal held that a grand jury transcript is not admissible during a Penal Code section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing. The trial court further erred by admitting police reports over a hearsay objection, as appellant’s stipulation to the reports as a factual basis for his plea did not constitute a stipulation to their use in a section 1172.6 hearing. The Court of Appeal remand the matter for a new evidentiary…
In a published opinion, the Court of Appeal held that a grand jury transcript is not admissible during a Penal Code section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing. The trial court further erred by admitting police reports over a hearsay objection, as appellant’s stipulation to the reports as a factual basis for his plea did not constitute a stipulation to their use in a section 1172.6 hearing. The Court of Appeal remand the matter for a new evidentiary hearing.
The Court of Appeal reversed appellant’s conviction for dissuading a witness, finding that the conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence that appellant’s acts occurred before the indictment was…
The Court of Appeal reversed appellant’s conviction for dissuading a witness, finding that the conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence that appellant’s acts occurred before the indictment was filed.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Family Services failed to comply with ICWA's inquiry…
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Family Services failed to comply with ICWA's inquiry requirements.
In 2022, after appellant's conviction for felony reckless evasion (Veh. Code, § 2800.2) and misdemeanor driving with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration (§ 23152, subd. (b)), the trial court granted probation for a period of three years. More than two years after probation was granted, appellant violated his probation, and the court imposed a felony sentence to be served in state prison.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the court lacked authority to impose a felony sentence because his violation of probation occurred after the first two years of the probationary term. Assembly Bill 1950, which took effect…
In 2022, after appellant's conviction for felony reckless evasion (Veh. Code, § 2800.2) and misdemeanor driving with a prohibited blood alcohol concentration (§ 23152, subd. (b)), the trial court granted probation for a period of three years. More than two years after probation was granted, appellant violated his probation, and the court imposed a felony sentence to be served in state prison.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the court lacked authority to impose a felony sentence because his violation of probation occurred after the first two years of the probationary term. Assembly Bill 1950, which took effect in 2021, amended Penal Code sections 1203a and 1203.1 to restrict the length of most probation terms. (Stats. 2020, ch. 328, §§ 1, 2.) Misdemeanor probation terms are generally limited to one year (§ 1203a, subd. (a)), and felony probation terms are generally limited to two years (§ 1203.1, subd. (a)). Exempt from these limits are offenses that "‘include[] specific probation lengths within [their] provisions.’ (§§ 1203a, subd. (b), 1203.1, subd. (m)(1).).” (People v. Saxton (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 428, 431.) Only appellant's misdemeanor offense fell under this exception. Accordingly, the trial court had authority only to impose misdemeanor punishment.
The matter was remanded for resentencing.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Health and Human Services Agency failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice…
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Health and Human Services Agency failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice requirements.
Appellant was convicted of three counts of murder after he crashed into another vehicle, killing its three occupants. Appellant’s blood tested positive for methamphetamine. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that implied malice murder can be based on an act that was “reasonably foreseeable” to cause death (rather than “highly likely” to cause death) and that the prosecutor erred by making arguments to the jury on the same point. The Court of Appeal reversed the murder convictions and ordered that they may be retried on…
Appellant was convicted of three counts of murder after he crashed into another vehicle, killing its three occupants. Appellant’s blood tested positive for methamphetamine. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that implied malice murder can be based on an act that was “reasonably foreseeable” to cause death (rather than “highly likely” to cause death) and that the prosecutor erred by making arguments to the jury on the same point. The Court of Appeal reversed the murder convictions and ordered that they may be retried on remand.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the remaining balance of appellant's restitution fine under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b) should be vacated because it has been more than 10 years since the original imposition of the fine. (Pen. Code, § 1465.9, subd. (d).) The court modified the judgment…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the remaining balance of appellant's restitution fine under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (b) should be vacated because it has been more than 10 years since the original imposition of the fine. (Pen. Code, § 1465.9, subd. (d).) The court modified the judgment accordingly.
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Social Services failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice…
In an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights, the Court of Appeal remanded for compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because the juvenile court and Department of Social Services failed to comply with ICWA’s inquiry and notice requirements.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the 25-years-to-life sentences on three of appellant's counts violate constitutional prohibitions on ex post facto laws because the offenses occurred prior to the effective date of the statute under which they were imposed (Pen. Code, § 667.61, subd. (j)(2)). The court modified the sentences to…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the 25-years-to-life sentences on three of appellant's counts violate constitutional prohibitions on ex post facto laws because the offenses occurred prior to the effective date of the statute under which they were imposed (Pen. Code, § 667.61, subd. (j)(2)). The court modified the sentences to 15-years-to-life.
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant's application for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. The lower court's finding that appellant's mental health disorder was not a significant factor in the commission of the underlying offenses was not supported by substantial evidence. The People had not offered any evidence that would support a finding that appellant's mental health disorder was not a contributing factor to the underlying offenses. The judgment was conditionally reversed and remanded for a new diversion eligibility…
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant's argument that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant's application for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. The lower court's finding that appellant's mental health disorder was not a significant factor in the commission of the underlying offenses was not supported by substantial evidence. The People had not offered any evidence that would support a finding that appellant's mental health disorder was not a contributing factor to the underlying offenses. The judgment was conditionally reversed and remanded for a new diversion eligibility hearing.
In this habeas petition filed under the Racial Justice Act, the Court of Appeal agreed with petitioner that “offense” as used in the RJA should be broadly construed to include the disparate charging and sentencing of enhancement allegations, including gang enhancements. The court agreed that an enhancement may form the basis of a petition for habeas relief alleging a violation of the RJA, and held that the current petition should be granted. The court remanded this matter to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with sections 745 and 1473, including the appointment of counsel to represent…
In this habeas petition filed under the Racial Justice Act, the Court of Appeal agreed with petitioner that “offense” as used in the RJA should be broadly construed to include the disparate charging and sentencing of enhancement allegations, including gang enhancements. The court agreed that an enhancement may form the basis of a petition for habeas relief alleging a violation of the RJA, and held that the current petition should be granted. The court remanded this matter to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with sections 745 and 1473, including the appointment of counsel to represent petitioner.
In 2003, appellant was convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP). He was 20 years old at the time of the murder. In 2023, he filed an in propria persona motion for appointment of counsel and requested a Franklin/Cook hearing to preserve mitigating evidence for use in a future youthful offender parole hearing. The trial court relied on People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 to find it had no authority to conduct a Franklin/Cook hearing.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the matter should…
In 2003, appellant was convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP). He was 20 years old at the time of the murder. In 2023, he filed an in propria persona motion for appointment of counsel and requested a Franklin/Cook hearing to preserve mitigating evidence for use in a future youthful offender parole hearing. The trial court relied on People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 to find it had no authority to conduct a Franklin/Cook hearing.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the matter should be remanded to allow appellant the opportunity to establish his eligibility for a Franklin/Cook hearing. The trial court's order was reversed and the matter remanded.
In 2018, appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court requesting a Franklin hearing. The court denied the petition on the grounds that defendant was not eligible. In 2024, defendant filed a motion requesting a Franklin hearing under Penal Code section 1203.01 and Cook. The trial court denied the motion as successive.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court erred when it denied appellant's motion for a Franklin/Cook hearing as successive. Nothing in section 1203.01 authorizes a court to bar a defendant from filing a Franklin motion if such request was…
In 2018, appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court requesting a Franklin hearing. The court denied the petition on the grounds that defendant was not eligible. In 2024, defendant filed a motion requesting a Franklin hearing under Penal Code section 1203.01 and Cook. The trial court denied the motion as successive.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court erred when it denied appellant's motion for a Franklin/Cook hearing as successive. Nothing in section 1203.01 authorizes a court to bar a defendant from filing a Franklin motion if such request was previously denied in a habeas petition. Additionally, although appellant originally sought a Franklin hearing by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, as Cook explained, habeas corpus was not the proper procedure in the first instance. (In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 457–458.) Accordingly, the court’s order denying the habeas petition did not bar the court from ruling on appellant's subsequent Franklin motion, which was properly raised under section 1203.01 and Cook.
The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and remanded for the court to consider appellant's motion.
In this appeal from the denial of appellant's Penal Code section 1172.6 petition, the court agreed with appellant that the trial court prejudicially erred in considering grand jury testimony at the evidentiary hearing. Because the error wasn’t harmless, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order denying appellant’s petition and remanded for a new evidentiary…
In this appeal from the denial of appellant's Penal Code section 1172.6 petition, the court agreed with appellant that the trial court prejudicially erred in considering grand jury testimony at the evidentiary hearing. Because the error wasn’t harmless, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order denying appellant’s petition and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant's motion for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. The trial court accepted the report diagnosing appellant with anxiety and depression and opining that he “was likely experiencing ongoing symptoms of anxiety” during the alleged offense. The court was nevertheless “not convinced whatsoever” that anxiety or depression was “causal whatsoever in terms of his actions in this matter.” This reasoning suggests that the court erroneously shifted the burden to appellant to prove that his mental health disorder contributed to the…
The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant's motion for pretrial mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36. The trial court accepted the report diagnosing appellant with anxiety and depression and opining that he “was likely experiencing ongoing symptoms of anxiety” during the alleged offense. The court was nevertheless “not convinced whatsoever” that anxiety or depression was “causal whatsoever in terms of his actions in this matter.” This reasoning suggests that the court erroneously shifted the burden to appellant to prove that his mental health disorder contributed to the offense. Additionally, there was no substantial evidence supporting that appellant's mental health disorder lacked the requisite causal connection to the charged offense. The Court of Appeal conditionally reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for reconsideration of appellant’s diversion motion.
In a bifurcated proceeding after appellant was convicted by jury, the trial court found true the allegations that he had a prior gang-related conviction (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a)) from 2015 that qualified as a prior serious felony and strike prior under the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (c), and (e), 1192.7, subd. (c)(28)). The court then doubled appellant's sentence under the three strikes law. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that in light of Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), the trial court’s true findings must be reversed. The matter was remanded for…
In a bifurcated proceeding after appellant was convicted by jury, the trial court found true the allegations that he had a prior gang-related conviction (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a)) from 2015 that qualified as a prior serious felony and strike prior under the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1), (c), and (e), 1192.7, subd. (c)(28)). The court then doubled appellant's sentence under the three strikes law. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that in light of Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), the trial court’s true findings must be reversed. The matter was remanded for full resentencing, with the prosecution having the option to retry the gang-related allegations.
In 2023, Nolen asked the trial court to resentence him pursuant to the newly enacted Penal Code section 1172.75 and to dismiss his prior strike conviction and all of the enhancements. The People argued that Nolen was not eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75 because the sentencing court had stayed the prior prison term enhancement. The court agreed with the People, citing People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38, reversed in People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, and declined to resentence Nolen. Six months after the trial court issued its order, the California Supreme Court reversed the decision on…
In 2023, Nolen asked the trial court to resentence him pursuant to the newly enacted Penal Code section 1172.75 and to dismiss his prior strike conviction and all of the enhancements. The People argued that Nolen was not eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75 because the sentencing court had stayed the prior prison term enhancement. The court agreed with the People, citing People v. Rhodius (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 38, reversed in People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, and declined to resentence Nolen. Six months after the trial court issued its order, the California Supreme Court reversed the decision on which the trial court had relied. Based on this new authority, the Court of Appeal reversed the denial of resentencing and remanded for further proceedings.
Appellant was convicted of multiple counts, including grand theft, for his unlawful killing of a mountain lion that had been part of a study conducted by a university. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that appellant's conviction for grand theft must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence that the university had a possessory interest in the lion. The well-settled rule in California is that no one holds a “personal property right in wild animals . . . unless captured, tamed or otherwise reduced to possession." (People v. Brady (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 954, 957.) The temporary capture and…
Appellant was convicted of multiple counts, including grand theft, for his unlawful killing of a mountain lion that had been part of a study conducted by a university. The Court of Appeal agreed with the parties that appellant's conviction for grand theft must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence that the university had a possessory interest in the lion. The well-settled rule in California is that no one holds a “personal property right in wild animals . . . unless captured, tamed or otherwise reduced to possession." (People v. Brady (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 954, 957.) The temporary capture and release of the lion into the wild with a tracking collar did not vest the university with an interest in the lion protectable by California's theft statutes. (C.f. Moerman v. State of California (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th.)
Appellant appealed following the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that the trial court erred in denying appellant’s petition at the prima facie stage. The only facts before the trial court were the indictment, the change of plea hearing, and his petition for resentencing. Nothing in these documents established as a matter of law that appellant was ineligible for…
Appellant appealed following the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that the trial court erred in denying appellant’s petition at the prima facie stage. The only facts before the trial court were the indictment, the change of plea hearing, and his petition for resentencing. Nothing in these documents established as a matter of law that appellant was ineligible for resentencing.
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that appellant’s kidnapping to commit robbery conviction should be reversed because there was no substantial evidence to support a finding of asportation. The movement of the victim down the hallway to the breakroom was incidental to the underlying robbery and the movement did not increase the risk of harm to the victim over and above the risk already present in the…
The Court of Appeal agreed with appellant that appellant’s kidnapping to commit robbery conviction should be reversed because there was no substantial evidence to support a finding of asportation. The movement of the victim down the hallway to the breakroom was incidental to the underlying robbery and the movement did not increase the risk of harm to the victim over and above the risk already present in the robbery.
Mother appealed the juvenile court’s dispositional order bypassing her for reunification services (WIC § 361.5, subd. (b)(6)). She contended the record lacked substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s determination that severe physical harm had been inflicted in accordance with section 361, subdivision (b)(6) and that reunification services would not benefit the child as required by section 361.5, subdivision (k). (In re T.R. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1140.) The Court of Appeal agreed, reversed the bypass order, and remand for further…
Mother appealed the juvenile court’s dispositional order bypassing her for reunification services (WIC § 361.5, subd. (b)(6)). She contended the record lacked substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s determination that severe physical harm had been inflicted in accordance with section 361, subdivision (b)(6) and that reunification services would not benefit the child as required by section 361.5, subdivision (k). (In re T.R. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1140.) The Court of Appeal agreed, reversed the bypass order, and remand for further proceedings.