Any trial error regarding when an entry occurred during a burglary was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the verdict in this case. After the close of evidence, the prosecution raised a new theory of burglary, arguing defendant had the requisite intent to commit a burglary when defendant later entered the victim C.M.’s bedroom instead of when he first entered her apartment. Any error regarding this new theory and the denial of a unanimity instruction was harmless under Chapman because of the jury’s true finding on the burglary circumstance attached to a count of sexual penetration in the kitchen; since…
Any trial error regarding when an entry occurred during a burglary was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the verdict in this case. After the close of evidence, the prosecution raised a new theory of burglary, arguing defendant had the requisite intent to commit a burglary when defendant later entered the victim C.M.’s bedroom instead of when he first entered her apartment. Any error regarding this new theory and the denial of a unanimity instruction was harmless under Chapman because of the jury’s true finding on the burglary circumstance attached to a count of sexual penetration in the kitchen; since defendant's entry into her bedroom did not occur until after the sexual penetration in the kitchen, by finding this circumstance true, the jurors necessarily agreed that Jones entered the victim's apartment with the requisite intent to commit a sexual offense. [Editor’s note: The Court of Appeal did not consider two juror declarations, excluded by the trial court under Evidence Code section 1150, which suggested that the jurors did not actually understand they were required to conclude defendant had the intent to commit a sexual offense when he entered the apartment.]
The prosecutor did not commit misconduct by stating in closing argument that C.M. was “no longer an alleged victim.” In the context of the prosecutor’s argument as a whole, the statement conveyed that the prosecutor wanted the jury to decide during deliberations that Jones was guilty, and thus that C.M. was actually a victim. There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury interpreted the statement to suggest that the presumption of innocence disappeared before the jury considered the evidence. This amounted to proper argument that the evidence proved Jones’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The full opinion is available on the court’s website here: https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A168930.PDF
