The trial court erred in failing to advise defendant of his Boykin/Tahl rights on prior convictions and aggravating factors before accepting defendant’s stipulation. Because nothing in the record affirmatively showed that defendant was aware of his rights, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant did not provide a knowing and voluntary waiver. The same requirements for advisement and waiver that apply to a defendant’s stipulation to a prior conviction apply to aggravating factors.
The full opinion is available on the court’s website here: https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B338040.PDF
The trial court erred in failing to advise defendant of his Boykin/Tahl rights on prior convictions and aggravating factors before accepting defendant’s stipulation. Because nothing in the record affirmatively showed that defendant was aware of his rights, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant did not provide a knowing and voluntary waiver. The same requirements for advisement and waiver that apply to a defendant’s stipulation to a prior conviction apply to aggravating factors.
The full opinion is available on the court’s website here: https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B338040.PDF
Under amended Penal Code section 1170, the sentencing court’s consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors in selecting the middle term did not implicate defendant’s Sixth Amendment jury trial rights. Defendant, who was under 26 years old when he committed the underlying crimes, agreed to plead guilty to a robbery charge with a firearm enhancement in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges and a sentencing lid of 13 years. At sentencing, the court considered aggravating and mitigating factors, and imposed the middle term of four years for robbery and four years for the firearm enhancement, for a total of eight…
Under amended Penal Code section 1170, the sentencing court’s consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors in selecting the middle term did not implicate defendant’s Sixth Amendment jury trial rights. Defendant, who was under 26 years old when he committed the underlying crimes, agreed to plead guilty to a robbery charge with a firearm enhancement in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges and a sentencing lid of 13 years. At sentencing, the court considered aggravating and mitigating factors, and imposed the middle term of four years for robbery and four years for the firearm enhancement, for a total of eight years. Defendant appealed, asserting the court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by imposing the middle, and not low terms, because the aggravating factors relied upon were not stipulated or proven to a jury. Held: Affirmed. Under Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, the federal jury trial guarantee proscribes a sentencing scheme that allows a judge to impose a sentence above the statutory maximum based on a fact, other than a prior conviction, not found by a jury or admitted by the defendant. However, under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) the low term does not become the statutory maximum based on the offender’s youth. The low term becomes presumptive only after the sentencing court makes findings in addition to those supporting the jury’s verdict. Further, the language and framework of the statute make clear that the sentencing court has discretion to impose the middle term even if it finds the defendant falls within one of the categories with a presumptive lower term. As such, the Sixth Amendment does not constrain this statutory, post-verdict factfinding by the sentencing court. [Editor’s Note: The Court of Appeal also held that no CPC was required to reach the issue, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in selecting the middle term.]
Under the facts of this case, defendant's sentence under Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (f)(1) violated due process because there was no indication in the information that he faced the possibility of a sentence under this subdivision. Wilford attacked his girlfriend on multiple occasions and was convicted by a jury of two counts of corporal injury to a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)) and related offenses. As to the corporal injury counts (counts 5 and 6), the trial court found Wilford had suffered a prior assault conviction within seven years of the current offenses (Pen. Code, §…
Under the facts of this case, defendant's sentence under Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (f)(1) violated due process because there was no indication in the information that he faced the possibility of a sentence under this subdivision. Wilford attacked his girlfriend on multiple occasions and was convicted by a jury of two counts of corporal injury to a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)) and related offenses. As to the corporal injury counts (counts 5 and 6), the trial court found Wilford had suffered a prior assault conviction within seven years of the current offenses (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (h)(1)), based on Wilford's past assaults against former girlfriends. Based on this finding, the prosecutor thereafter requested that Wilford be sentenced under section 273.5, subdivision (f)(1). The trial court agreed, even though section 273.5, subdivision (f)(1) was not referenced in the information. Wilford appealed. Held: Reversed. A defendant has a due process right to fair notice of the specific sentence enhancement allegations that will be relied upon to increase punishment for his crimes. Here, the amended information referenced section 273.5, subdivision (h)(1), indicating the prior conviction allegation could add 15 days to Wilford's sentence. Nothing in the information referenced section 273.5, subdivision (f)(1), which increased the applicable sentencing range. Although every fact necessary to impose the sentence under section 273.5, subdivision (f)(1) was alleged in the information and found true, the resulting punishment was different, and Wilford was not appraised of the possible prison sentence he faced under section 273.5, subdivision (f)(1) until after the jury verdict and true finding on the qualifying prior conviction. This shortcoming was critical because Wilford was offered and rejected a plea bargain prior to trial, and the amended information did not provide him with the information necessary to make an informed decision about the plea offer. The court distinguished People v. Tardy (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 783.
The full opinion is available on the court's website here: http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D069888.PDF
Mexican murder conviction is not a serious felony under California law. Navarette was convicted of a number of offenses arising from a domestic incident with his ex-girlfriend. A prior serious felony enhancement and a strike prior were found true based on Navarette's 2006 murder conviction in Mexico. Navarette appealed, arguing that the Mexican offense did not include all the elements of murder in California and therefore the evidence was insufficient to support the prior serious felony enhancement and strike prior. Held: Reversed. "To qualify as a serious felony, a conviction from another jurisdiction must involve conduct that would qualify as…
Mexican murder conviction is not a serious felony under California law. Navarette was convicted of a number of offenses arising from a domestic incident with his ex-girlfriend. A prior serious felony enhancement and a strike prior were found true based on Navarette's 2006 murder conviction in Mexico. Navarette appealed, arguing that the Mexican offense did not include all the elements of murder in California and therefore the evidence was insufficient to support the prior serious felony enhancement and strike prior. Held: Reversed. "To qualify as a serious felony, a conviction from another jurisdiction must involve conduct that would qualify as a serious felony in California." (People v. McGee (2006) 38 Cal.4th 682.) The elements of murder in Mexico are different and broader than California. In Mexico, the prosecution does not need to prove malice aforethought; committing an intentional or imprudent act is sufficient. Furthermore, in Mexico, the prosecution does not bear the burden of disproving self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The People incorrectly asserted that the trial court was free to evaluate the record of the Mexican offense to determine that it included all the elements of murder under California law. "McGee prohibits the court from resolving disputed issues of fact in determining whether the prior conviction 'realistically' may have been based on conduct that would not constitute a serious felony under California law." A similar result is required pursuant to federal law. Under Descamps v. United States (2013) 133 S.Ct. 2276, a sentencing court cannot, without violating the Sixth Amendment, "look beyond the elements to the evidence or . . . explore whether a person convicted of one crime could also have been convicted of another, more serious offense."
The full opinion is available on the court's website here: http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/F069534.PDF
A trial court's determination that a minor homicide defendant is "irreparably corrupt" and deserving of a life without parole (LWOP) sentence, is not a fact that must be found by a jury. In 2007, six months before his eighteenth birthday, Blackwell attempted a residential robbery and burglary during which a resident was killed. Blackwell was convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances and sentenced to LWOP. In his first appeal, Blackwell's sentence was reversed for resentencing pursuant to the constitutional standards announced in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 132 S.Ct. 2455 (Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory LWOP for juvenile convicted of…
A trial court's determination that a minor homicide defendant is "irreparably corrupt" and deserving of a life without parole (LWOP) sentence, is not a fact that must be found by a jury. In 2007, six months before his eighteenth birthday, Blackwell attempted a residential robbery and burglary during which a resident was killed. Blackwell was convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances and sentenced to LWOP. In his first appeal, Blackwell's sentence was reversed for resentencing pursuant to the constitutional standards announced in Miller v. Alabama (2012) 132 S.Ct. 2455 (Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory LWOP for juvenile convicted of murder). On remand Blackwell again received an LWOP sentence. On appeal, he claimed his punishment exceeded the statutory maximum absent a jury finding of "irreparable corruption." Held: Affirmed. Penal Code sections 190.2 and 190.5, subdivision (b) require a special circumstance finding before a 16 or 17-year-old is eligible for an LWOP term. Thus the "statutory maximum" for Blackwell's offense for Sixth Amendment purposes was determined once the jury returned its verdict of first degree murder with special circumstances. The issue of who should determine whether a juvenile offender receives an LWOP sentence was not decided in Miller (which held the trial court must consider all relevant evidence bearing on the distinctive attributes of youth when determining an appropriate punishment). The trial court's consideration of the Miller factors in determining Blackwell's sentence did not violate the Sixth Amendment or Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [finding of facts needed to impose sentence in excess of statutory maximum must be made by jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt], as these factors merely summarized the absence of youth-based mitigation.
Miller v. Alabama does not impose a categorical Eighth Amendment sentencing limit that bars imposition of an LWOP term on a minor homicide defendant absent a jury finding the defendant is "irreparably corrupt." The Miller opinion does not bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime, it only mandates a certain processthat the sentencer consider an offender's youth and attendant characteristicsbefore imposing an LWOP sentence. The Miller case drew a line between juvenile defendants whose crimes were the product of transient immaturity and those rare minors whose offenses reflect irreparable corruption. However, Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement. "'Irreparable corruption' is not a factual finding, but merely 'encapsulates the [absence] of youth-based mitigation.'" This finding need not be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt because it is not being used to "aggravate" or "enhance" the sentence.
The Eighth Amendment does not categorically prohibit LWOP for juvenile offenders who do not kill or intend to kill. Blackwell claimed the Eighth Amendment prohibits an LWOP sentence for a juvenile defendant unless he personally killed or intended to kill, and that in his case the jury did not make these findings. In Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, the Court determined the Eighth Amendment provides a categorical limit on punishment for juveniles who commit a nonhomicide offense. It found the practice of sentencing juvenile offenders to LWOP unjustifiable under penological theory and unconstitutional in nonhomicide cases. But the Graham holding has not been extended to a juvenile offender who is convicted of homicide but who did not personally kill or intend to kill and the Court of Appeal declined to read Graham so expansively.
In imposing a sentence, the trial court is not prohibited from making factual findings that are inconsistent with the jury's verdict of acquittal on other counts. Blackwell argued the jury's not true finding on the gun use enhancement reflected he was convicted as an aider and abettor. Therefore, he claimed, the court improperly elevated his sentence to LWOP based on its finding he was the killer. However, the jury's not true finding on the gun use allegation did not constitute an affirmative finding that Blackwell was only an aider and abettor. Facts considered by the court in selecting the appropriate sentence need only be found by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, the trial court may take into account its own factual findings with regard to the defendant's conduct related to an offense of which the defendant was acquitted, without implicating the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced juvenile offender to LWOP. A trial court's exercise of its sentencing discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing the court acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner, resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Blackwell maintained the court placed too much emphasis on the circumstances of the offense and gave too little weight to the immaturity of the offender. The Court of Appeal declined Blackwell's request to find that Miller creates a presumption of immaturity, rendering 25 years-to-life the presumptive sentence. So long as a sentencing court considers the Miller factors, it may give such weight to the relevant facts as it deems reasonably appropriate under the circumstances. In resentencing Blackwell, the trial court explicitly considered the Miller factors with no presumption in favor of LWOP. In selecting LWOP based on Blackwell's circumstances and the heinous nature of the offense, the court did not abuse its discretion.
The full opinion is available on the court's website here: http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A144424.PDF
Defendant had a constitutional right to be present in the trial court during resentencing after obtaining federal habeas relief. Sanchez was convicted of numerous offenses and originally sentenced to 63 years to life in prison. The trial court had imposed a consecutive term of one year, eight months on Sanchez's conviction for possession of a concealed stolen gun in a vehicle (count five; Pen. Code, § 25400, subd. (a)(1)), and stayed (Pen. Code, § 654) the term on his conviction for possession of a loaded gun in a vehicle (count eight; Pen. Code, § 25850, subd. (a)). After the state…
Defendant had a constitutional right to be present in the trial court during resentencing after obtaining federal habeas relief. Sanchez was convicted of numerous offenses and originally sentenced to 63 years to life in prison. The trial court had imposed a consecutive term of one year, eight months on Sanchez's conviction for possession of a concealed stolen gun in a vehicle (count five; Pen. Code, § 25400, subd. (a)(1)), and stayed (Pen. Code, § 654) the term on his conviction for possession of a loaded gun in a vehicle (count eight; Pen. Code, § 25850, subd. (a)). After the state court affirmed his conviction, Sanchez filed a federal habeas petition. The federal district court found prejudicial error related to Sanchez's conviction on count five and granted relief. When the case was back in the superior court for resentencing, the court held that Sanchez had no right to be present. It ordered the term on count eight, which had previously been concurrent and stayed, to be served consecutively. Sanchez appealed. Held: Reversed and remanded. A defendant has a constitutional right to be present for resentencing. In this case, instead of simply lifting the section 654 stay on count eight, the trial court changed a concurrent term to a consecutive one. By altering the sentence to create a more onerous one, the trial court in effect resentenced Sanchez. He therefore had a right to be present.
The sentence on for active participation in a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a)) should be stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. After Sanchez's first appeal was decided the California Supreme Court held in People v. Mesa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 191, that a defendant may not be punished for participation in a criminal street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (a)) where the only evidence supporting the offense was the commission of a charged offense for which the defendant was also convicted and sentenced. That is the case here. The sentence for the section 186.22, subdivision (a) conviction must be stayed.
The full opinion is available on the court's website here: http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G050481.PDF
Felony punishment for oral copulation with a minor, while sexual intercourse with a minor is punishable as a misdemeanor, does not violate equal protection of the law. Defendants Fields and Griffin were convicted of numerous sexual offenses against minor females. One issue Griffin raised on appeal challenged the discrepancy between his felony sentence for oral copulation with a minor (Pen. Code, § 288a, subd. (b)(1)) and the misdemeanor punishment prescribed for sexual intercourse with a minor (§ 261.5, subd. (b)). Held: Affirmed. In People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, the court held that mandatory sex offender registration (§ 290)…
Felony punishment for oral copulation with a minor, while sexual intercourse with a minor is punishable as a misdemeanor, does not violate equal protection of the law. Defendants Fields and Griffin were convicted of numerous sexual offenses against minor females. One issue Griffin raised on appeal challenged the discrepancy between his felony sentence for oral copulation with a minor (Pen. Code, § 288a, subd. (b)(1)) and the misdemeanor punishment prescribed for sexual intercourse with a minor (§ 261.5, subd. (b)). Held: Affirmed. In People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, the court held that mandatory sex offender registration (§ 290) for a voluntary sex act with a minor 16 years or older (§ 288a, subd. (b)(1)), violated equal protection because an adult convicted of sexual intercourse with a minor 16 years of age or older (§ 261.5) was subject to discretionary registration. However, Hofsheier did not address whether there may be a rational reason for the Legislature to provide trial courts greater discretion in sentencing for adults who engage in oral copulation with a minor over the age of 16 than adults who engage in sexual intercourse with such a minor. The burden of establishing the invalidity of a classification under the rational relationship test rests on Griffin. He must demonstrate that the disparity in punishment between section 288a, subdivision (b)(1) offenders and those convicted of violating section 261.5, subdivision (b) "bears no rational relationship to any conceivable legitimate state purpose." He did not do this. "It is not irrational for the Legislature to want to deter offenses it perceives as more common, more difficult to detect, and more likely to be committed than similar offenses, by imposing more severe punishment for them, even if the less common offenses involve a greater risk of harm."
District court's error in imposing sentence in excess of statutory minimum based on a fact that was not supported by any jury finding was harmless. Defendants were convicted in federal court of robbing a Vons Federal Credit Union in Santa Fe Springs, California. The jury found that both defendants used and carried a firearm during the commission of a violent crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which subjected the defendants to a mandatory minimum sentence of five years in addition to the punishment imposed for the substantive offense. The mandatory minimum increases to 10 years if the gun…
District court's error in imposing sentence in excess of statutory minimum based on a fact that was not supported by any jury finding was harmless. Defendants were convicted in federal court of robbing a Vons Federal Credit Union in Santa Fe Springs, California. The jury found that both defendants used and carried a firearm during the commission of a violent crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which subjected the defendants to a mandatory minimum sentence of five years in addition to the punishment imposed for the substantive offense. The mandatory minimum increases to 10 years if the gun is discharged during the crime, but the jury made no finding regarding discharge of the weapons. At sentencing, the district court found that both defendants discharged their guns and applied a 10-year mandatory minimum penalty. On appeal, defendants claimed error, as the jury did not make a finding as to this fact. Held: Affirmed. In Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, the Court held that any fact other than the fact of a prior conviction that increases the sentence for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. This was extended to the statutory minimum in Alleyne v. U.S. (2013) 133 S.Ct. 2151, which applies to defendants as it was decided before their cases were final (Griffith v. Kentucky (1987) 469 U.S. 314). The court's imposition of a 10-year statutory minimum that was unsupported by any jury finding was therefore error. It was harmless, however, because the reviewing court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by substantial evidence.
The district court did not err by admitting a witness's pretrial identification testimony. Defendants claimed the district court erred by allowing witness Fields to testify regarding her pretrial identification of them because the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive and unreliable to such an extent that misidentification was likely. Such claims require a three-part inquiry: (1) was the pretrial identification impermissibly suggestive; (2) if so, was it sufficiently reliable such that it does not implicate the defendant's due process rights; and (3) was any error prejudicial. (Simmons v. U.S. (1968) 390 U.S. 377.) An identification procedure is suggestive when, based on the totality of the circumstances, it directs the focus upon a single individual, thereby increasing the risk of misidentification. Here, the defense presented no reason to discredit the officer's testimony that the witness was presented with an array of 12 photographs and immediately chose the pictures of the three defendants, which was not impermissibly suggestive. This conclusion is not changed by the fact the officer failed to admonish the witness that the photos presented may not include the suspects. While this failure may undermine the reliability of the identification, it does not render it inadmissible.
As a term of probation, defendant may be ordered to provide his passwords to cellphones and social media websites, as well as to submit to warrantless searches. Appellant was granted probation after he pled no contest to criminal threats and resisting an officer, and admitted a gang allegation pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(B). His probation terms required him to provide all passwords to electronic devices such as phones and computers, and to submit these devices to warrantless searches. He was also required to provide passwords to social media websites and submit those websites to warrantless searches. On appeal,…
As a term of probation, defendant may be ordered to provide his passwords to cellphones and social media websites, as well as to submit to warrantless searches. Appellant was granted probation after he pled no contest to criminal threats and resisting an officer, and admitted a gang allegation pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(B). His probation terms required him to provide all passwords to electronic devices such as phones and computers, and to submit these devices to warrantless searches. He was also required to provide passwords to social media websites and submit those websites to warrantless searches. On appeal, appellant claimed that the conditions were overbroad and unreasonable. Held: Affirmed. The state's interest in preventing appellant from participating in gang activities outweighed the minimal invasion of his privacy involved in a probation officer's monitoring his use of devices and social media while on probation. Appellant's current convictions were gang related, and the probation conditions were designed to allow the probation officer to monitor his gang associations and activities, and were therefore reasonable.
Mandatory supervision condition that requires former gang member to report to police gang unit is reasonable to ensure appellant's compliance with his release terms. Appellant pled guilty to resisting an officer (Pen. Code, § 69) and was sentenced to county prison for two years, with one year suspended and a year of mandatory supervision under terms and conditions. He claimed a term requiring him to report to the gang unit of the police is unreasonable because he is no longer a gang member, his offense was not gang related, and the condition is not calculated to prevent future criminality. Held:…
Mandatory supervision condition that requires former gang member to report to police gang unit is reasonable to ensure appellant's compliance with his release terms. Appellant pled guilty to resisting an officer (Pen. Code, § 69) and was sentenced to county prison for two years, with one year suspended and a year of mandatory supervision under terms and conditions. He claimed a term requiring him to report to the gang unit of the police is unreasonable because he is no longer a gang member, his offense was not gang related, and the condition is not calculated to prevent future criminality. Held: Affirmed. Although supervised release is monitored by the probation department, it is not the equivalent of a grant of probation. A county jail commitment under the Realignment Act is akin to a prison sentence; mandatory supervision is similar to parole. The reasonableness of parole conditions is evaluated under the same standards used to assess probation terms. Here, appellant committed a number of gang-related offenses in the past and was only recently "jumped out" of his gang. He lunged at and grabbed an officer while the officer was observing his gang tattoos. Disassociation from gang members and making police aware of appellant's supervision terms will reduce the temptation for him to return to criminal behavior. As a result, the condition is reasonably related to future criminality and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the condition.
Condition restricting appellant's access to court building is reasonable, but needed scienter requirement. Appellant claimed the term preventing him from being present at a court building except as a witness, party, or defendant is unreasonable, is overbroad, and violates his First Amendment right to court access. However, such conditions have been upheld as valid gang terms. Here, the condition was intended to prevent appellant from intimidating witnesses in gang-related proceedings, which was proper and reasonable in this case. The Court of Appeal modified the condition to state that appellant shall not be present at any criminal court proceeding or courthouse building that he knows or reasonably should know involves gang charges or members, whether as defendants or witnesses.